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Monotonicity-Constrained Nonparametric Estimation and
Inference for First-Price Auctions∗
Jun Ma† Vadim Marmer‡ Artyom Shneyerov§ Pai Xu¶
Abstract
We propose a new nonparametric estimator for first-price auctions with independent private values that imposes
the monotonicity constraint on the estimated inverse bidding strategy. We show that our estimator has a smaller
asymptotic variance than that of Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong’s (2000) estimator. In addition to establishing
pointwise asymptotic normality of our estimator, we provide a bootstrap-based approach to constructing uniform
confidence bands for the density function of latent valuations.
1 Introduction
Shape restrictions on infinite-dimensional parameters have received much attention in econometric research. The roles
of shape restrictions in the literature include facilitating identification, providing testable implications and improving
estimation and inference. See Chetverikov et al. (2018) for a recent review.
This paper focuses on the first-price sealed-bid auction model with symmetric bidders, which is the same as that
studied in Guerre et al. (2000, GPV, hereafter). GPV’s estimation strategy uses a nonparametrically estimated inverse
bidding function to generate pseudo valuations. However, the true bidding strategy must be strictly increasing and the
plug-in nonparametric estimator of GPV ignores this shape restriction. Imposing such a constraint at the estimation
stage nonparametrically is interesting. For this purpose, we may use the methods in the monotone nonparametric
regression literature.1 Some of these methods can be easily adapted to producing constrained estimators for the
inverse bidding strategy in the auction setting. E.g., Henderson et al. (2012) take the constrained re-weighting
approach pioneered by Hall and Huang (2001), which was originally used to build a monotone estimator for the
conditional expectation function. Luo and Wan (2018) impose monotonicity by using the greatest convex minorant of
the integrated quantile function of values.
In this paper, we pursue a different approach. We investigate the asymptotic properties of a new monotonicity-
constrained estimator based on the smooth rearrangement approach of Dette et al. (2006) and propose a uniform
confidence band around this monotonicity-constrained nonparametric estimator. We show that this rearrangement-
based monotonicity-constrained estimator is asymptotically normal with an asymptotic variance smaller than the
unconstrained estimator as in GPV. Since the asymptotic variance plays an important role in determining the width
of a uniform confidence band in large samples, the fact that the rearrangement-based estimator has a smaller asymptotic
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1See Henderson and Parmeter (2009) for a comprehensive survey of the literature on monotone nonparametric regression.
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variance will result in sharper inference. Our estimator also has substantial computational advantage over Henderson
et al. (2012).2
As a by-product, our method also produces a simple estimator for the true bidding function. Note that GPV’s
procedure is based on the inverse-bidding strategy, which has a simple form. On the other hand, the bidding function
has an integral expression that depends on the unknown distribution of latent valuations and constructing its direct
plug-in type estimator would be cumbersome. Our simple estimator of the bidding function can be of interest on its
own, as it can be used in practical applications for computing counterfactual bids.
We compare the finite sample performances of the confidence bands based on the rearrangement-based and the
unconstrained estimators in Monte Carlo experiments. We find that the confidence band based on the rearrangement-
based estimator tends to be narrower without sacrificing the coverage accuracy.
The literature on structural econometrics of auctions is vast. See Gentry et al. (2018) for a recent review; see also
the reviews of the literature in Athey and Haile (2007) and Hendricks and Porter (2007). In their seminal paper,
GPV demonstrate nonparametric identification of the first-price auction model with independent private values, and
propose two-step nonparametric estimation of the density of latent valuations. This paper improves on the GPV
estimator by incorporating the monotonicity constraint in the nonparametric estimation procedure.
In a recent paper, Ma et al. (2018, MMS, hereafter) describe the asymptotic distribution of the GPV estimator
and propose a valid bootstrap procedure based on the GPV estimator. They also propose a procedure for constructing
uniform confidence bands for the density of latent valuations. This paper builds on their results.
The GPV estimator has been widely used in the empirical literature. For examples of applications, see the
literature review in Athey and Haile (2007) and Hendricks and Porter (2007). The GPV approach has been also
utilized in models with risk aversion (Guerre et al., 2009, Zincenko, 2018), unobserved heterogeneity (Krasnokutskaya,
2011), bidder asymmetry and affiliated values (Li et al., 2002), common values (Haile et al., 2003, Hendricks et al.,
2003), and entry (Li and Zheng, 2009, Marmer et al., 2013, Gentry and Li, 2014).
The recent related literature includes Liu and Vuong (2013), who propose a test for the monotonicity of the bidding
function, Liu and Luo (2017), who propose a procedure for comparing valuation distributions, Marmer and Shneyerov
(2012), Luo and Wan (2018), Gimenes (2017), who propose quantile based methods in the context of auctions. Our
paper is also related to the econometrics literature on two-step nonparametric estimation. See, e.g., Mammen et al.
(2012).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the empirical auction model studied in this
paper and its estimation technique, including the GPV estimator and a new monotonicity-constrained estimator. In
Section 3, we show that the new estimator is asymptotically normal with a smaller asymptotic variance, compared to
the unconstrained estimator. Section 4 provides an estimator for the asymptotic variance and a uniform confidence
band around the new monotonicity-constrained estimator. We extend the proposed estimation and inference method
to an auction model with observed auction heterogeneity in Section 5. Section 6 reports Monte Carlo simulation
results. Proofs are collected in the appendix.
Notation. “a := b” is understood as “a is defined by b”. “a =: b” is understood as “b is defined by a”. 1 (·) denotes
the indicator function, and we also denote 1A := 1 (· ∈ A). Let ℓ
∞ (A) be the class of bounded functions defined on
A. For any f ∈ ℓ∞ (A), let ‖f‖A := sup
x∈A
|f (x)| be the sup-norm.
2See Dette and Pilz (2006) for simulation studies that compare the rearrangement and reweighting approaches to monotone regression.
Dette and Pilz (2006) notice that the rearrangement approach has computational advantage since the reweighting approach requires solving
constrained optimization.
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2 The Auction Model and Estimation
In this section, we consider an auction model for homogeneous goods and with a fixed number of bidders. A model
with observed covariates capturing auction-specific heterogeneity will be considered in Section 5. The econometrician
observes bids from L auctions, with a fixed number of bidders in each auction:
{Bil : i = 1, . . . , N, l = 1, . . . , L} . (2.1)
Bidders’ valuations
{Vil : i = 1, . . . , N, l = 1, . . . , L}
are not unobservable to the econometrician. We assume the distribution of the valuations satisfy the following as-
sumption.
Assumption 1 (Data Generating Process). (a). The unobserved valuations
{Vil : i = 1, . . . , N, l = 1, . . . , L}
are i.i.d. with PDF f and CDF F . (b). f is strictly positive and bounded away from zero on its support, a compact
interval [v, v] ⊆ R+, and is twice continuously differentiable on (v, v).
Assumption 1(a) assumes that the bidders are symmetric and the auctions are identical. Assumption 1 is similar
to Assumptions A1 and A2 of GPV and Assumption 1 of MMS. The object of interest is the PDF of the valuations
at interior points of [v, v]. Suppose that vl > v, vu < v and I := [vl, vu] is an inner closed sub-interval of [v, v].
We assume that the observed bids are generated from the valuations and by the Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE)
bidding strategy:
Bil = s (Vil) := Vil −
1
F (Vil)
N−1
∫ Vil
v
F (u)
N−1
du. (2.2)
The BNE requires that the bidding strategy s is strictly increasing. Moreover, GPV show that s is at least three times
continuously differentiable on (v, v). The inverse of the BNE bidding strategy can be written as
ξ (b) := s−1 (b) = b+
1
N − 1
G (b)
g (b)
, (2.3)
where G and g are CDF and PDF of the bids, respectively. Let b := s (v) and b := s (v) denote the boundaries of
support for the observed i.i.d. bids. GPV show that g is three-times continuously differentiable and also bounded
away from zero on its support
[
b, b
]
:
Cg := inf
b∈[b,b]
g (b) > 0. (2.4)
Let Ĝ be the empirical CDF of the bids:
Ĝ (b) :=
1
N · L
∑
i,l
1 (Bil ≤ b)
and ĝ be the kernel density estimator of g:
ĝ (b) :=
1
N · L
∑
i,l
1
hg
Kg
(
Bil − b
hg
)
(2.5)
3
with some bandwidth hg > 0 and kernel Kg. Therefore, the plug-in nonparametric estimator of the inverse bidding
strategy ξ is
ξ̂ (b) := b+
1
N − 1
Ĝ (b)
ĝ (b)
. (2.6)
For each Bil, we construct a pseudo valuation by V̂il := ξ̂ (Bil). There is a boundary bias issue when ordinary kernel
density estimator as in (2.5) is used. Thus, the pseudo valuations corresponding to bids in boundary regions are
contaminated. GPV propose to trim off bids that lie in
[
b̂, b̂+ hg
)
∪
(
b̂− hg, b̂
]
, where
b̂ :=max {Bil : i = 1, ..., N, l = 1, ..., L}
b̂ :=min {Bil : i = 1, ..., N, l = 1, ..., L} .
We modify the kernel density estimator ĝ (b) in the boundary region b ∈ [b, b+ hg)∪
(
b− hg, b
]
to avoid boundary
bias and trimming.3 Another concern is that, in order to remove more bias, we need to make use of the fact that
the bid density g is smoother than the valuation density f and use a higher-order kernel when estimating the inverse
bidding strategy.4 A suitable choice is the local quadratic minimum contrast estimator (MCE). See Bickel and Doksum
(2015, Chapter 11.3).5 Similar to the local polynomial regression, the local quadratic MCE automatically adapts to
the boundary so that the rate of the bias is the same in the boundary region and the interior.6 The local quadratic
MCE coincides with the kernel density estimator (2.5) with a fourth-order kernel, and therefore we achieve desired
bias removal in the interior region
[
b+ hg, b− hg
]
. The GPV estimator is
f̂GPV (v) :=
1
N · L
∑
i,l
1
hf
Kf
(
V̂il − v
hf
)
,
for some bandwidth hf > 0 and kernel Kf . We note again that trimming can be avoided.
Another important observation is that the plug-in estimator (2.6) may not be monotone in finite samples, although
its population counterpart ξ is strictly increasing under the assumption that the empirical auction model is correctly-
specified. We apply smooth rearrangement to build a new monotonicity-constrained estimator of ξ on the plug-in
estimator ξ̂. Define
ŝ (t) :=
∫ b̂
b̂
∫ t
−∞
1
hr
Kr
(
ξ̂ (b)− u
hr
)
dudb+ b̂, t ∈ R, (2.7)
for some bandwidth hr > 0 and (second-order) kernel function Kr. Denote K˜r (u) :=
∫ u
−∞Kr (t) dt. Alternatively we
can write
ŝ (t) =
∫ b̂
b̂
K˜r
(
t− ξ̂ (b)
hr
)
db + b̂, t ∈ R. (2.8)
(2.8) contains less challenge in computation as the expression of K˜r is always available for standard kernel functions.
3See Hickman and Hubbard (2014) for more discussion on why we should avoid trimming when estimating the auction model using
GPV approach.
4See Remark 2.3 of MMS.
5See Jales et al. (2017) and Ma et al. (2018) for more recent applications of MCE in econometrics.
6Note that the MCE requires knowledge of the locations of the endpoints b and b. Since the estimators b̂ and b̂ are super-consistent:
b̂ = b + Op (log (L) /L) and b̂ = b + Op (log (L) /L), we can replace the unknown endpoints in the MCE with these estimators without
affecting the validity of the asymptotic results.
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It is clear that ŝ is increasing on R and
ŝ (t) =

b̂ if t ≤ inf
b∈
[
b̂,̂b
]ξ̂ (b)− hr
b̂ if t ≥ sup
b∈
[
b̂,̂b
]ξ̂ (b) + hr
It is easy to see that ŝ can be viewed as an estimator of the bidding function s (see Lemma 2). Note that this
estimator is of interest on its own, as the bidding function s is an important structural object. Moreover, constructing
an estimator of s directly from its expression in (2.2) can be cumbersome.
Let ŝ−1 denote the pseudo inverse of ŝ:
ŝ−1 (b) := inf {u ∈ R : ŝ (u) ≥ b} .
ŝ−1 is a rearrangement-based estimator of ξ with the monotonicity constraint imposed. A new modified GPV esti-
mation procedure now can be proposed: First, we construct ξ̂, the plug-in nonparametric estimator of the inverse
bidding strategy ξ. To avoid trimming, we use the local quadratic MCE instead of the ordinary kernel density es-
timator. Then, we construct the monotonicity-imposed estimator of the inverse bidding strategy: ŝ−1 and generate
monotonicity-constrained pseudo valuations V̂ †il := ŝ
−1 (Bil) for i = 1, ..., N , l = 1, ..., L. A new estimator, the
rearrangement-based GPV (RGPV), is
f̂RGPV (v) :=
1
N · L
∑
i,l
1
hf
Kf
(
V̂ †il − v
hf
)
.
The RGPV estimation procedure is computationally more involved than the standard GPV procedure. When
implementing it in practice, the integral in (2.8) can be approximated by an upper Riemann sum. Let M ∈ N be a
very large number. Let d :=
(
b̂− b̂
)
/M . We can approximate
∫ b̂
b̂ K˜r
((
t− ξ̂ (b)
)
/hr
)
db by
M∑
i=1
K˜r
 t− ξ̂
(
b̂+ i · d
)
hr
 d.
However, unlike the estimator in Henderson et al. (2012), it is not required to solve a constrained optimization problem.
Thus the RGPV estimation procedure is computationally less demanding than Henderson et al. (2012)’s estimation
procedure, which is based on constrained reweighting.
An alternative, and closely related, approach is to impose the monotonicity restriction through the “non-smooth”
rearrangement. Instead of using (2.7), we can define
ŝ0 (t) :=
∫ b̂
b̂
1
(
ξ̂ (b) ≤ t
)
db+ b̂, t ∈ R,
and use ŝ−10 as a monotonicity-constrained estimator of ξ to generated pseudo valuations. If the empirical auction
model is correctly specified so that ξ is strictly increasing, ŝ−10 is always an improvement over the plug-in estimator ξ̂,
in the sense that ŝ−10 has a strictly smaller (finite-sample) integrated mean square error whenever ξ̂ is not monotonic.
See Chernozhukov et al., 2009, Proposition 1. However, for the structural auction model, the parameter of interest
is the density f . It is unclear whether the density estimator based on pseudo valuations generated by ŝ−10 is an
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improvement over the unconstrained GPV estimator theoretically. In this paper, we focus on smooth rearrangement
and in the next section, we show that based on the RGPV estimator we could potentially achieve sharper inference in
large samples, which can be regarded as theoretical advantage over the unconstrained GPV estimator.
3 Asymptotic Properties
The following assumptions are imposed on the kernel functions and the bandwidths, respectively.
Assumption 2 (Kernel). Kf is a probability density function that is symmetric around 0, compactly supported on
[−1, 1] and has at least two Lipschitz continuous derivatives on R. Moreover, Kr = Kf and the same kernel function
is used in the local quadratic MCE of the bid density.
Assumption 3 (Bandwidth). Let h be a sequence {hL}
∞
L=1 satisfying h = L
−γ for 1/7 ≤ γ ≤ 1/3. hf = λfh,
hg = λgh and hr = λrh for some positive constants λf , λg and λr.
Assumption 2 implies that the kernel functions are of second order. When the kernel used in the local quadratic
MCE of the bid density is second-order, at the interior points, the MCE is the same as the ordinary kernel density
estimator (2.5) with Kg being fourth-order. Assumption 3 is similar to Assumption 3 in MMS.
It is shown in MMS that under assumptions 1-3,
(
Lh2fhg
)1/2 (
f̂GPV (v)− f (v)
)
→d N(0,VGPV (v)) , (3.1)
where
VGPV (v) :=
1
N (N − 1)
2
F (v)2 f (v)2
g (s (v))
3
∫ {∫
K ′f (u)Kg
(
w −
λf
λg
s′ (v)u
)
du
}2
dw. (3.2)
MMS show that the asymptotic variance (3.2) can be consistently estimated by some estimator V̂GPV (v) and an
asymptotically valid confidence interval for f (v) can be constructed:[
f̂GPV (v)− z1−α/2
√
V̂GPV (v)
Lh2fhg
, f̂GPV (v) + z1−α/2
√
V̂GPV (v)
Lh2fhg
]
, (3.3)
where z1−α/2 denotes the 1−α/2 quantile of the standard normal distribution. Note that V̂GPV (v) and its probabilistic
limit VGPV (v) play important roles in determining the length of the confidence interval. Furthermore, a bootstrap
uniform confidence band is given by
CBGPV (v) :=
[
f̂GPV (v)− ζGPV,α
√
V̂GPV (v)
Lh2fhg
, f̂GPV (v) + ζGPV,α
√
V̂GPV (v)
Lh2fhg
]
, for v ∈ I,
where ζGPV,α is some bootstrap critical value. It can be shown that
P [f (v) ∈ CBGPV (v) , for all v ∈ I]→ 1− α, as L ↑ ∞.
Next, we show that a similar asymptotic normality result holds for the RGPV estimator, but with a smaller
asymptotic variance. The proof uses the same arguments as in the proof of Theorem 2.1 in MMS. First, we derive the
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following asymptotic representation:
f̂RGPV (v)− f (v) =
1
(N − 1)
·
1
(N · L)
2
∑
i,l
∑
j,k
M (Bil, Bjk; v) + op
((
Lh3
)−1/2)
, (3.4)
where the remainder term is uniform in v ∈ I . Moreover,
M (b′, b; v) := −
1
h2f
K ′f
(
ξ (b′)− v
hf
)
ξ′ (b′)
∫ b
b
1
hr
Kr
(
ξ (b′)− ξ (u)
hr
)
G (u)
g (u)
2
(
1
hg
Kg
(
b− u
hg
)
− g (u)
)
du.
Note that this “kernel” is different from that of the unconstrained GPV estimator. See Equation (2.6) of MMS.
Define
M1 (b; v) :=
∫
M (b, b′; v) dG (b′) ,
M2 (b; v) :=
∫
M (b′, b; v) dG (b′) and µM (v) :=
∫ ∫
M (b, b′; v) dG (b) dG (b′) . (3.5)
Note that µM (v) = E [M1 (B11; v)] = E [M2 (B11; v)]. Applying Hoeffding decomposition to the leading term in (3.4)
and techniques from the theories of empirical processes and U processes, we can show that
f̂RGPV (v)− f (v) =
1
N − 1
·
1
N · L
∑
i,l
(M2 (Bil; v)− µM (v)) + op
((
Lh3
)−1/2)
,
where the remainder term is uniform in v ∈ I. M2 (Bil; v) − µM (v), i = 1, ..., N , l = 1, ..., L are independent,
zero-mean but dependent on the bandwidths. This term can be shown asymptotically normal.
Theorem 1. Suppose that Assumptions 1 - 3 are satisfied and v ∈ (v, v). Also assume that λr = λf . Then,(
Lh2fhg
)1/2 (
f̂RGPV (v)− f (v)
)
→d N(0,VRGPV (v)) , (3.6)
where
VRGPV (v) :=
1
N (N − 1)
2
F (v)
2
f (v)
2
g (s (v))
3
∫ {∫ ∫
K ′f (u)Kr (u− z)Kg
(
w −
λf
λg
s′ (v) z
)
dzdu
}2
dw. (3.7)
Moreover,
VRGPV (v) ≤ VGPV (v) (3.8)
for all v ∈ (v, v).
Remark 3.1. In the proof of Theorem 1, we show that
E
 Lh2fhg
(N − 1)
2
 1
N · L
∑
i,l
(M2 (Bil; v)− µM (v))
2

=
1
N (N − 1)2 h2fhg
∫ {∫
K ′f
(
ξ (b′)− v
hf
)
ξ′ (b′)
∫ b
b
1
hr
Kr
(
ξ (b′)− ξ (u)
hr
)
G (u)
g (u)2
Kg
(
b− u
hg
)
dudG (b′)
}2
dG (b)
+O
(
h3
)
=:VM (v) +O
(
h3
)
, (3.9)
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where the remainder term is uniform in v ∈ I. The asymptotic variance is the limit of the leading term of (3.9) as
h ↓ 0:
lim
h↓0
1
h2fhg
∫ {∫
K ′f
(
ξ (b′)− v
hf
)
ξ′ (b′)
∫ b
b
1
hr
Kr
(
ξ (b′)− ξ (u)
hr
)
G (u)
g (u)2
Kg
(
b − u
hg
)
dudG (b′)
}2
dG (b)
=
F (v)2 f (v)2
g (s (v))
3
∫ {∫ ∫
K ′f (u)Kr (u− z)Kg
(
w −
λf
λg
s′ (v) z
)
dzdu
}2
dw.
A consistent estimator of the asymptotic variance VRGPV (v) can be derived based on the sample analogue of VM (v).
Remark 3.2. The proof of Theorem 1 also incorporates the bias term:
(
Lh2fhg
)1/2 (
f̂RGPV (v)− f (v)− ι (v)
)
→d N(0,VRGPV (v)) ,
where
ι (v) :=
1
2
f ′′ (v)
(∫
Kf (u)u
2du
)
h2f +
1
2
(s′′′ (v) f (v) + s′′ (v) f ′ (v)) s′ (v)− s′′ (v)
2
f (v)
s′ (v)
2
(∫
Kr (u)u
2du
)
h2r.
A comparison of ι (v) with the bias given in Remark 2.3 of MMS shows that the smooth rearrangement incurs additional
bias. For inference, we take the “under-smoothing” approach to select sufficiently small bandwidths so that these bias
terms become negligible.
Remark 3.3. MMS show that the GPV estimator has a smaller asymptotic variance than the quantile-based estimator
of Marmer and Shneyerov (2012). The proof of (3.8) uses similar arguments. It is easy to show that the inequality
(3.8) is strict for all v ∈ (v, v), if the kernel function satisfies K ′ (u) < 0 for all u ∈ (0, 1) and K ′ (u) > 0 for all
u ∈ (−1, 0).
Suppose that the valuations are drawn from the family of distributions
F (v) =

0, v < 0
vθ, 0 ≤ v ≤ 1
1, v > 1
supported on [0, 1] with some parameter θ > 0. The Bayesian Nash equilibrium bidding strategy in this example is
s (v) =
(
1−
1
θ (N − 1) + 1
)
v,
which is linear in v. Thus, the ratio VGPV (v) /VRGPV (v) is independent from v, by the definitions of VRGPV (v) and
VGPV (v). In this example, we choose the triweight kernel
K (u) =
35
32
(
1− u2
)3
1 (|u| ≤ 1) .
We can analytically evaluate the multi-dimensional integrals in (3.2) and (3.7) and calculate VGPV (v) /VRGPV (v) in
this example. We experiment with different combinations of (θ,N), and find that the ratio VGPV (v) /VRGPV (v) can
be quite large in my cases. For instance, in the case of (θ,N) = (1, 5), VGPV (v) /VRGPV (v) is approximately 1.587.
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4 Inference
If the asymptotic variance VRGPV (v) in (3.7) can be consistently estimated by some estimator V̂RGPV (v), Theorem
1 shows that we can construct an asymptotically valid confidence interval for f (v):[
f̂RGPV (v)− z1−α/2
√
V̂RGPV (v)
Lh2fhg
, f̂RGPV (v) + z1−α/2
√
V̂RGPV (v)
Lh2fhg
]
. (4.1)
As shown in (3.8), our rearrangement-based estimator has a smaller asymptotic variance than the GPV estimator.
Therefore, the confidence intervals based on our estimator in (4.1) should be shorter than those based on the GPV
estimator in (3.3) in large samples.
An estimator of VRGPV (v) is derived based on the sample analogue of VM (v), (see (3.9)):
V̂RGPV (v) :=
1
N (N − 1)
2
h2fhg
1
(N · L) (N · L− 1) (N · L− 2)
∑
i,l
∑
(j,k) 6=(i,l)
∑
(j′,k′) 6=(i,l), (j′,k′) 6=(j,k)
ηil,jk(v)ηil,j′k′ (v),
ηil,jk(v) :=K
′
f
(
V̂ †jk − v
hf
)
1
ŝ′
(
V̂ †jk
) ∫ b̂
b̂
1
hr
Kr
(
V̂ †jk − ξ̂ (u)
hr
)
Ĝ (u)
ĝ (u)
2Kg
(
Bil − u
hg
)
du,
where we use the fact ξ′ (b) = 1/s′ (ξ (b)) and
ŝ′ (v) :=
∫ b̂
b̂
1
hr
Kr
(
ξ̂ (b)− v
hr
)
db.
The integral can be approximated by an upper Riemann sum in practice. The following result provides uniform
consistency of the variance estimator and also an estimate of its uniform rate of convergence. The proof uses the same
arguments as in the proof of Theorem 3.1 of MMS.
Theorem 2. Suppose that Assumptions 1 - 3 are satisfied. Then,
sup
v∈I
∣∣∣V̂RGPV (v)−VM (v)∣∣∣ = Op
((
log (L)
Lh3
)1/2
+ h2
)
.
An alternative approach to constructing pointwise confidence intervals is based on bootstrapping. Let
{B∗il : i = 1, . . . , N, l = 1, . . . , L} (4.2)
denote a set of independent random variables drawn from the original sample (2.1) with replacement. Ĝ∗ and ĝ∗
denote the bootstrap analogues of Ĝ and ĝ respectively. Let ξ̂∗ be the bootstrap analogue of ξ̂. ξ̂∗ is defined by
replacing Ĝ and ĝ with Ĝ∗ and ĝ∗. We further define
ŝ∗ (t) :=
∫ b̂
b̂
∫ t
−∞
1
hr
Kr
(
ξ̂∗ (b)− u
hr
)
dudb+ b̂, t ∈ R
and bootstrap analogues of V̂ †il , denoted by V̂
†∗
il , i = 1, . . . , N , l = 1, . . . , L by using the pseudo inverse of ŝ
∗. Lastly,
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we construct a bootstrap analogue of f̂RGPV :
f̂∗RGPV (v) :=
1
N · L
∑
i,l
1
hf
Kf
(
V̂ †∗il − v
hf
)
.
The percentile bootstrap pointwise confidence interval for f (v) is[
q∗α/2 (v) , q
∗
1−α/2 (v)
]
,
where q∗τ (v) is the τ−th quantile of the conditional distribution of f̂
∗
RGPV (v) given the original sample.
The pointwise inference results for f(v) described above can be extended for the inference on the optimal reserve
price, as the latter is a function of the density at the reserve price. Such an extension is discussed in Section 8 in
MMS. Similarly, a function of the density (1 − F (v))/f(v) is of interest in applications as it represents the markup
of the bidder with value v. Again, since relatively to GPV’s our rearrangement estimator has a smaller asymptotic
variance, basing inference on optimal reserve price or the markup on our estimator would result in more powerful tests
and shorter confidence intervals.
Next, we show that a bootstrap-based uniform confidence band for {f (v) : v ∈ I} centered at the rearrangement-
based estimator can be constructed by using intermediate Gaussian approximation pioneered by Chernozhukov et al.
(2014b,a, 2016). Consider the following bootstrap process
Z∗ (v) :=
f̂∗RGPV (v)− f̂RGPV (v)(
Lh2fhg
)−1/2
V̂RGPV (v)
1/2
, v ∈ I. (4.3)
Let P∗ [·] denote the probability conditional on the original sample and
ζRGPV,α := inf {z ∈ R : P
∗ [‖Z∗‖I ≤ z] ≥ 1− α}
be the (1− α)-quantile of the conditional distribution of ‖Z∗‖I given the original sample. A uniform confidence band
around the rearrangement-based estimator is
CBRGPV (v) :=
[
f̂RGPV (v)− ζRGPV,α
√
V̂RGPV (v)
Lh2fhg
, f̂RGPV (v) + ζRGPV,α
√
V̂RGPV (v)
Lh2fhg
]
, for v ∈ I.
The following theorem establishes the asymptotic validity of CBRGPV . Its proof uses the same arguments as in the
proof of Corollary 4.3 of MMS.
Theorem 3. Suppose that Assumptions 1 - 3 are satisfied. Then,
P [f (v) ∈ CBRGPV (v) , for all v ∈ I]→ 1− α, as L ↑ ∞.
5 Auction-Specific Heterogeneity
In previous sections, we focused on the case of identical auctions with a fixed number of bidders. In this section, we
consider auction models with auction-specific heterogeneity. The econometrician observes data from L auctions. Let
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X l denote the d-dimensional relevant characteristics for the object in the l-th auction. Let Nl denote the number of
bidders in the l-th auction. Let Bil denote the bid submitted by the i-th bidder in the l-th auction. The data observed
by the econometrician is given by
{(Bil,X l, Nl) : i = 1, ..., Nl, l = 1, ..., L} .
Unobserved bidders’ valuations are denoted by
{Vil : i = 1, ..., Nl, l = 1, ..., L} .
Assume that {(X l, Nl) : l = 1, ..., L} are i.i.d. and for each l = 1, ..., L, given X l = x and Nl = n, the valuations
{Vil : i = 1, ..., n} are i.i.d. with conditional PDF f (·|x). We follow the literature and assume that the valuations and
the number of bidders Nl are conditionally independent given the observed characteristics X l.
7 Also assume that the
conditional probability mass function of Nl given X l has a known support {n, ..., n}.
The observed bid Bil is assumed from the Bayesian Nash equilibrium bidding for risk-neutral bidder i submitted
in the l-th auction. Let G (·|x, n) denote the conditional CDF of Bil given X l = x and Nl = n. Let g (·|x, n) be the
conditional PDF. The inverse bidding strategy in this context becomes
Vil = ξ (Bil,X l, Nl) := Bil +
1
Nl − 1
G (Bil|X l, Nl)
g (Bil|X l, Nl)
. (5.1)
For estimation and inference, we can generate pseudo valuations from (5.1) by replacing the true conditional
CDF and PDF by their kernel estimators. The GPV estimator can be defined analogously in this general context.
Asymptotically valid pointwise confidence intervals and uniform confidence bands for f (·|x) can be constructed. See
Section 5 of MMS for more details.
Following Haile et al. (2003), we use a semi-parametric approach to homogenize the bids.8 Let
{ǫil : i = 1, ..., Nl, l = 1, ..., L} (5.2)
denote positive i.i.d. idiosyncratic values that are independent from the auction-specific characteristicsX l, l = 1, ..., L.
Let Fǫ be its CDF and [ǫ, ǫ] be its support. Define
B˜il = s (ǫil, Nl) := ǫil −
1
Fǫ (ǫil)
Nl−1
∫ ǫil
ǫ
Fǫ (u)
Nl−1 du.
Let
G˜ (b|n) := P
[
B˜il ≤ b|Nl = n
]
be the conditional CDF and g˜ (b|n) be the corresponding conditional PDF. Note that we have
ǫil = s (ǫil, Nl) +
1
Nl − 1
G˜ (s (ǫil, Nl) |Nl)
g˜ (s (ǫil, Nl) |Nl)
. (5.3)
The approach of Haile et al. (2003) assumes that, for some parametric function Υ to be specified below, Vil =
Υ (X l) ǫil for i = 1, ..., Nl and l = 1, ..., L. It then can be shown that the conditional CDF and PDF of Υ (X l) B˜il
7For a test of this assumption, see Liu and Luo (2017).
8The homogenization approach is used extensively in the literature, e.g. Athey et al. (2011), Liu and Luo (2017), Luo and Wan (2018),
and many others.
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(denoted by G˜Υ and g˜Υ , respectively) satisfy
G˜Υ (b|X l, Nl) := P
[
Υ (X l) B˜il ≤ b|X l, Nl
]
= G˜
(
b
Υ (X l)
|Nl
)
and
g˜Υ (b|X l, Nl) = g˜
(
b
Υ (X l)
|Nl
)
1
Υ (X l)
.
It is clear from these results and (5.3) that
Υ (X l) ǫil = Υ (X l) s (ǫil, Nl) +
1
Nl − 1
G˜Υ (Υ (X l) s (ǫil, Nl) |X l, Nl)
g˜Υ (Υ (X l) s (ǫil, Nl) |X l, Nl)
,
which implies that Bil = Υ (X l) B˜il, for i = 1, ..., Nl and l = 1, ..., L.
Now, we write
log (Bil) = α (Nl) + log (Υ (X l)) + Uil, (5.4)
where
α (Nl) := E [log (s (ǫil, Nl)) |Nl] and Uil :=log (s (ǫil, Nl))− α (Nl) .
It is easy to check that E [Uil|X l, Nl] = 0. Since Nl is discrete, we can write
α (Nl) =
n∑
n=n
αn1 (Nl = n) .
We assume that the function Υ is log-linear in parameters: log (Υ (X l)) =X
T
l β for some unknown β. Now (5.4) can
be written as
log (Bil) =
n∑
n=n
αn1 (Nl = n) +X
T
l β + Uil.
Regressing the log-bids on the covariates and the indicators for the number of bidders yields an estimator β̂ of β.
Then, the homogenized bids are given by
B0il := exp
(
log (Bil) + x
T
0 β̂ −X
T
l β̂
)
, for i = 1, ..., Nl and l = 1, ..., L. (5.5)
These bids can be interpreted as the bid that would have been submitted by the i-th bidder if the covariates were
equal to x0, in the l-th auction. Suppose we are interested in inference on f (·|x0) for some fixed x0.
9
Let
Ĝ (b, n) :=
1
L
L∑
l=1
1 (Nl = n)
1
Nl
Nl∑
i=1
1
(
B0il ≤ b
)
,
ĝ (b, n) :=
1
L
L∑
l=1
1 (Nl = n)
1
Nl
Nl∑
i=1
1
hg
Kg
(
B0il − b
hg
)
and
ξ̂ (b, n) := b+
1
n− 1
Ĝ (b, n)
ĝ (b, n)
.
ŝ (·, n) can also be defined analogously and ŝ−1 (·, n) is its pseudo inverse. Let V̂ 0†il := ŝ
−1
(
B0il, Nl
)
be the monotonicity-
9For example, x0 can be taken to be the sample mean L−1
∑L
l=1 Xl. See Haile et al. (2003).
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constrained pseudo valuations.
A semi-parametric estimator of f (·|x0) is
f̂ (v|x0) :=
1
L
L∑
l=1
1
Nl
Nl∑
i=1
1
hf
Kf
(
V̂ 0†il − v
hf
)
,
which is asymptotically normal. Its asymptotic variance can be consistently estimated by
V̂RGPV (v) :=
n∑
n=n
1
n (n− 1)
2
h2fhg
×
1
L (L− 1) (L− 2)
L∑
l=1
∑
k 6=l
∑
k′ 6=k,k′ 6=l
1 (Nl = n,Nk = n,Nk′ = n)
1
Nl
Nl∑
i=1
ηil,k (v) ηil,k′ (v) ,
where
ηil,k (v) :=
1
Nk
Nk∑
j=1
K ′f
(
V̂ 0†jk − v
hf
)
1
ŝ′
(
V̂ 0†jk , Nk
) ∫ b̂0Nk
b̂
0
Nk
1
hr
Kr
(
V̂ 0†jk − ξ̂ (u,Nk)
hr
)
Ĝ (u,Nk)
ĝ (u,Nk)
2Kg
(
B0jk − u
hg
)
du,
ŝ′ (v, n) :=
∫ b̂0n
b̂
0
n
1
hr
Kr
(
ξ̂ (b, n)− v
hr
)
db
and
b̂
0
n := max
(i,l):Nl=n
B0il and b̂
0
n := min
(i,l):Nl=n
B0il.
A pointwise confidence interval for f (v|x0) that is of the same form as (4.1) can be proved to be asymptotically
valid. For bootstrap resampling, we treat the homogenized bids (5.5) as our observed bids and apply the two-step
resampling procedure provided by Marmer and Shneyerov (2012). In each bootstrap replication, we first randomly
draw L observations from {Nl : l = 1, ..., L} with replacement. Next, we randomly draw bids with replacement from
bids corresponding to the selected number of bidders. If for the l-th observation in the bootstrap sample, we have
N∗l = Nl′ , then let
{
B0∗il : i = 1, ..., N
∗
l
}
be i.i.d. draws from all the bids in auctions with number of bidders being Nl′
with replacement. Now the bootstrap sample is
(
B0∗il , N
∗
l
)
, i = 1, ..., N∗l and l = 1, ..., L. Then it is straightforward
to construct the bootstrap analogue of f̂ (·|x0) and a bootstrap-based uniform confidence band for f (·|x0) can be
constructed analogously.
6 Monte Carlo Simulations
In this section, we assess the finite-sample performances of the uniform confidence bands based on both the uncon-
strained GPV estimator and the rearrangement-based monotonicity-constrained estimator proposed in this paper.
Our simulation design follows Marmer and Shneyerov (2012) and the DGP is described in Remark 3.3. We consider
θ = 1 and draw 2100 independent valuations from Fθ. In all these cases, the number of bidders N is constant. The
number of auctions is determined by N · L = 2100. We choose Kr = Kf to be the second-order triweight kernel.
For estimation of the inverse bidding strategy, we use the second-order triweight kernel in the MCE. In this case, the
kernel Kg in the expressions of the asymptotic variances is the fourth-order triweight kernel.
We use the same bandwidths as in GPV. We take hg = 3.72 · σ̂b · (N · L)
−1/5
when estimating the inverse bidding
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Table 1: Coverage probabilities and the relative supremum width WGPV /WRPGV of the bootstrap-based uniform
confidence bands around the GPV and rearrangement estimators, θ = 1
GPV Rearrangement WGPV /WRPGV
0.90 0.95 0.99 0.90 0.95 0.99 0.90 0.95 0.99
v ∈ [0.3, 0.7]
N = 3 0.908 0.956 0.990 0.918 0.956 0.992 1.334 1.326 1.315
N = 5 0.882 0.940 0.996 0.888 0.936 0.994 1.099 1.094 1.093
N = 7 0.890 0.946 0.988 0.872 0.942 0.986 1.069 1.068 1.072
v ∈ [0.2, 0.8]
N = 3 0.910 0.948 0.990 0.882 0.938 0.990 1.316 1.305 1.288
N = 5 0.918 0.966 0.996 0.906 0.956 0.992 1.132 1.133 1.132
N = 7 0.900 0.944 0.984 0.900 0.952 0.986 1.129 1.132 1.132
strategy. σ̂b is the estimated standard deviation of the observed bids. We use hf = 3.15 · σ̂v ·(N · L)
−1/5
as the second-
step bandwidth, where σ̂v is the estimated standard deviation of the (unconstrained) pseudo valuations. The constants
3.72 and 3.15 are Silverman’s rule-of-thumb constants corresponding to fourth-order and second-order triweight kernels.
When imposing monotonicity, we take hr = hf . We consider different numbers of bidders N ∈ {3, 5, 7}, and also the
density function over the ranges v ∈ [0.2, 0.8] and v ∈ [0.3, 0.7]. When computing the bootstrap-based critical values,
we set the number of bootstrap replications to 499 and use grid maximization over the grid [vl : 0.001 : vu].
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The main result of this paper is that imposing monotonicity using smooth rearrangement results in more efficient
inference. Therefore, in addition to assessing coverage accuracy, we also report the ratio of the supremum widths of
the confidence bands:
WGPV := sup
v∈I
2 · ζGPV,α
√
V̂GPV (v)
Lh2fhg
and WRGPV := sup
v∈I
2 · ζRGPV,α
√
V̂RGPV (v)
Lh2fhg
.
Table 1 reports the coverage probabilities as well as the relative supremum width of the confidence bands based
on the GPV and our rearrangement estimators. The coverage probabilities of both methods are similar and accurate.
However, our approach can produce considerably smaller confidence with the reduction in supremum width ranging
from 6.8% to 33.4%. More substantial reductions in supremum width are obtained for smaller numbers of bidders.
This is due to the inverse relationship between the number of bidders and the asymptotic variance of the estimators.
7 Conclusion
The GPV nonparametric identification and estimation approach is an indispensable working tool in structural econo-
metrics of auctions. This paper contributes to the literature by showing how one can reduce the asymptotic variance
of GPV-type estimators by incorporating the monotonicity constraint in estimation. While monotonicity-constrained
estimators have been previously considered in the auction literature, to the best of our knowledge ours is the first to
obtain a reduction in asymptotic variance in this context. Our method is simple to implement, and as a by-product,
it also produces a simple estimator for the bidding function. We also discuss construction of uniform confidence bands
for the density of valuations. In a simulation study, we show that by applying our approach one can increase the
precision of the confidence bands without sacrificing their coverage in finite samples.
10We also tried a finer grid [vl : 0.0001 : vu], which produced similar results.
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Appendix
Let > denote an inequality up to a universal constant that does not depend on the sample size L. For a sequence of
classes of functions FL (that may depend on the sample size) defined on
[
b, b
]d
, for some d ≥ 1, let N
(
ǫ,FL, ‖·‖Q,2
)
denote the ǫ−covering number, i.e., the smallest integer m such that there are m balls of radius ǫ centered at points
in FL, with respect to the metric induced by the norm ‖·‖Q,2, where ‖f‖Q,2 :=
(∫
|f |
2
dQ
)1/2
, f ∈ FL. A function
FL :
[
b, b
]d
→ R+ is an envelope of FL if FL ≥ sup
f∈FL
|f |. We say that FL is a (uniform) Vapnik-Chervonenkis-type
(VC-type) class with respect to the envelope FL (see, e.g., Chernozhukov et al., 2014b, Definition 2.1) if there exist
some positive constant C1 and C2 that are independent of L such that
N
(
ǫ ‖FL‖Q,2 ,FL, ‖·‖Q,2
)
≤
(
C1
ǫ
)C2
, for all ǫ ∈ (0, 1],
for all finitely discrete probability measure Q on
[
b, b
]d
. Note that the all function classes that appear later are
dependent on L. We suppress the dependence for notational simplicity.
“With probability approaching 1” is abbreviated as “w.p.a.1”. For notational simplicity, in the proofs, max
i,l
is
understood as max
(i,l)∈{1,...,N}×{1,...,L}
.
∑
(2)
is understood as
∑
(j,k) 6=(i,l) and
∑
(3)
is understood as
∑
i,l
∑
(j,k) 6=(i,l)
∑
(j′,k′) 6=(i,l), (j′,k′) 6=(j,k)
,
i.e., summing over all distinct indices. (N · L)2 is understood as (N · L) (N · L− 1) and (N · L)3 is understood as
(N · L) (N · L− 1) (N · L− 2).
Fix
δ0 := min {(v − vu) /2, (vl − v) /2} .
A Proofs of the Main Results
Proof of Theorem 1. It follows from Lemma 7 that
(
Lh2fhg
)1/2 (
f̂GPV (v)− f (v)
)
=
1
N1/2 (N − 1)
1
(N · L)
1/2
∑
i,l
hfh
1/2
g (M2 (Bil; v)− µM (v)) + op (1) .
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Denote
M‡ (b′, b; v) := −
1
h2f
K ′f
(
ξ (b′)− v
hf
)
ξ′ (b′)
∫ b
b
1
hr
Kr
(
ξ (b′)− ξ (u)
hr
)
G (u)
g (u)
2
1
hg
Kg
(
b− u
hg
)
du
M‡2 (b; v) := −
∫
1
h2f
K ′f
(
ξ (b′)− v
hf
)
ξ′ (b′)
∫ b
b
1
hr
Kr
(
ξ (b′)− ξ (u)
hr
)
G (u)
g (u)2
1
hg
Kg
(
b− u
hg
)
dudG (b′)
and µM‡ (v) :=
∫ ∫
M‡ (b, b′; v) dG (b) dG (b′) =
∫
M‡2 (b; v) dG (b) .
Then it is clear that
M2 (Bil; v)− µM (v) =M
‡
2 (Bil; v)− µM‡ (v) for all i = 1, ..., N and L = 1, ..., L
and
µM‡ (v) = µM (v)−
∫ ∫ b
b
1
h2f
K ′f
(
ξ (b′)− v
hf
)
ξ′ (b′)
1
hf
Kr
(
ξ (b′)− ξ (u)
hf
)
G (u)
g (u)
dudG (b′) .
Note that we assumed hr = hf . By change of variables,
∫ ∫ b
b
K ′f
(
ξ (b′)− v
hf
)
ξ′ (b′)
1
hf
Kr
(
ξ (b′)− ξ (u)
hf
)
G (u)
g (u)
dudG (b′)
=hf
∫ v−v
hf
v−v
hf
∫ v−v
hf
v−v
hf
K ′f (w)Kr (w − z)
G (s (hfz + v))
g (s (hfz + v))
s′ (hfz + v) g (s (hfw + v)) dzdw
=hf
∫ v−v
hf
v−v
hf
∫ v−v
hf
v−v
hf
K ′f (w)Kr (w − z)
G (s (v)) s′ (v)g (s (v)) +
{
g (s (v¨)) s′ (v¨)2 +G (s (v¨)) s′′ (v¨)
}
g (s (v¨))
g (s (v¨))
2 hfz
−
G (s (v¨)) s′ (v¨)
2
g′ (s (v¨))
g (s (v¨))
2 hfz
}
{g (s (v)) + g′ (s (v˙)) s′ (v˙)hfw} dzdw,
where v˙ and v¨ are mean values that are dependent on w and z with |v˙ − v| ≤ hf |w| and |v¨ − v| ≤ hf |z|.
Since when hf is small enough,
∫ v−v
hf
v−v
hf
∫ v−v
hf
v−v
hf
K ′f (w)Kr (w − z) dzdw = 0,
it follows that ∫ ∫ b
b
K ′f
(
ξ (b′)− v
hf
)
ξ′ (b′)
1
hf
Kr
(
ξ (b′)− ξ (u)
hf
)
G (u)
g (u)
dudG (b′) = O
(
h2
)
,
uniformly in v ∈ I. sup
v∈I
|µM‡ (v)| = O (1) follows from this result and Lemma 6.
Define
Uil (v) :=
1
N1/2 (N − 1)
1
(N · L)
1/2
hfh
1/2
g
(
M‡2 (Bil; v)− µM‡ (v)
)
,
and
σ (v) :=
∑
i,l
E
[
Uil (v)
2
]1/2 = ( 1
N (N − 1)
2h
2
fhgE
[(
M‡2 (B11; v)− µM‡ (v)
)2])1/2
. (A.1)
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By change of variables,
E
[
h2fhgM
‡
2 (B11; v)
2
]
=
∫
1
hg
{∫ b
b
∫ b
b
1
hf
K ′
(
ξ (b′)− v
hf
)
1
s′ (ξ (b′))
1
hf
K
(
ξ (b′)− ξ (u)
hf
)
G (u)
g (u)
2
×K
(
b− u
hg
)
g (b′) dudb′
}2
dG (b)
=
∫ b−s(v)
hg
b−s(v)
hg
ρh (y)
2
g (hgy + s (v)) dy.
where
ρh (y) :=
∫ v−v
hf
v−v
hf
∫ v−v
hf
v−v
hf
K ′f (w)Kr (w − z)
G (s (hfz + v))
g (s (hfz + v))
2Kg
(
y −
s (hfz + v)− s (v)
hg
)
×s′ (hfz + v) g (s (hfw + v)) dzdw. (A.2)
We can easily verify that the dominated convergence theorem applies to the integral on the right hand side of (A.2)
(as h ↓ 0) for each y ∈ R:
lim
h↓0
ρh (y) =
G (s (v)) s′ (v)
g (s (v))
∫ ∫
K ′f (w)Kr (w − z)Kg
(
y − s′ (v)
λf
λg
z
)
dzdw.
Since K ′f and Kr are compactly supported on [−1, 1], by reverse triangle inequality,
|ρh (y)| >
∫ v−v
hf
v−v
hf
∫ v−v
hf
v−v
hf
|K ′ (w)| |1 (|z| ≤ 1 + |w|)|1
(
|y| ≤ 1 +
∣∣∣∣s (hfz + v)− s (v)hg
∣∣∣∣) dzdw
> 1
(
|y| ≤ 1 + 2
λf
λg
Cs′
)
,
where Cs′ := sup
v∈[v,v]
s′ (v).
Now the dominated convergence theorem applies and
lim
h↓0
∫ b−s(v)
hg
b−s(v)
hg
ρh (y)
2
g (hgy + s (v)) dy
=
G (s (v))
2
s′ (v)
2
g (s (v))
∫ {∫ ∫
K ′ (w)K (w − z)K
(
y − s′ (v)
λf
λg
z
)
dzdw
}2
dy
=
F (v)2 f (v)2
g (s (v))
3
∫ {∫ ∫
K ′ (w)K (w − z)K
(
y − s′ (v)
λf
λg
z
)
dzdw
}2
dy
where the second equality follows from the relation f (v) = g (s (v)) s′ (v). It follows from this result and sup
v∈I
|µM‡ (v)| =
O (1) that
E
[
h2fhg
(
M‡2 (B11; v)− µM‡ (v)
)2]
=E
[
h2fhgM
‡
2 (B11; v)
2
]
− h2fhgµM‡ (v)
2
=
F (v)
2
f (v)
2
g (s (v))
3
∫ {∫ ∫
K ′f (w)Kr (w − z)Kg
(
y − s′ (v)
λf
λg
z
)
dzdw
}2
dy + o (1) (A.3)
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and thus
σ (v) =
1
N1/2 (N − 1)
{
F (v)
2
f (v)
2
g (s (v))
3
∫ {∫ ∫
K ′f (w)Kr (w − z)Kg
(
y − s′ (v)
λf
λg
z
)
dzdw
}2
dy
}1/2
+ o (1) .11
(A.4)
By the cr inequality (see, e.g., Davidson, 1994, 9.28), we have
∑
i,l
E
[∣∣∣∣Uil (v)σ (v)
∣∣∣∣3
]
= σ (v)−3 (N − 1)−3 (N · L)−1/2 E
[
h3fh
3/2
g
∣∣∣(M‡2 (B11; v)− µM‡ (v))∣∣∣3]
> σ (v)−3 (N · L)−1/2
(
h3fh
3/2
g E
[∣∣∣M‡2 (B11; v)∣∣∣3]+ h3fh3/2g |µM‡ (v)|3) . (A.5)
Then it is easy to verify that the Lyapunov’s condition holds:
lim
L↑∞
∑
i,l
E
[∣∣∣∣Uil (v)σ (v)
∣∣∣∣3
]
= 0. (A.6)
By Lyapunov’s central limit theorem,
∑
i,l
Uil (v)
σ (v)
→d N(0, 1) , as L ↑ ∞. (A.7)
For the second part, it suffices to show∫ {∫ ∫
K ′f (u)Kr (u− z)Kg
(
w −
λf
λg
s′ (v) z
)
dzdu
}2
dw ≤
∫ {∫
K ′f (u)Kg
(
w − s′ (v)
λf
λg
u
)
du
}2
dw.
For each w ∈ R, since Kr and K
′
f are assumed to be bounded and compactly supported, the Fubini-Tonelli theorem
applies and therefore,∫ ∫
K ′f (u)Kr (u− z)Kg
(
w −
λf
λg
s′ (v) z
)
dzdu =
∫ (∫
K ′f (u)Kr (u− z) du
)
Kg
(
w −
λf
λg
s′ (v) z
)
dz.
Since Kr and K
′
f are supported on [−1, 1], by integration by parts,∫ 1
−1
K ′f (u)Kr (u− z) du−
∫ 1
−1
Kf (u)K
′
r (u− z) du = 0. (A.8)
Now,{∫ ∫
K ′f (u)Kr (u− z)Kg
(
w −
λf
λg
s′ (v) z
)
dzdu
}2
=
{∫ (∫
Kf (u)K
′
r (u− z) du
)
Kg
(
w −
λf
λg
s′ (v) z
)
dz
}2
=
{∫ ∫
Kf (u)K
′
r (u− z)Kg
(
w −
λf
λg
s′ (v) z
)
dzdu
}2
≤
∫
Kf (u)
{∫
K ′r (u− z)Kg
(
w −
λf
λg
s′ (v) z
)
dz
}2
du,(A.9)
11It is easy to adapt the proofs to show that the remainder terms are indeed uniform in v ∈ I. See the proof of Theorem 2.1 of MMS.
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for each w ∈ R, where the first equality follows from (A.8), the second equality follows from the Fubini-Tonelli theorem
and the inequality follows from Jensen’s inequality since Kf is a probability density function.
Since the inequality (A.9) holds for all w ∈ R, by the Fubini-Tonelli theorem,
∫ {∫ ∫
K ′f (u)Kr (u− z)Kg
(
w −
λf
λg
s′ (v) z
)
dzdu
}2
dw
≤
∫
Kf (u)
∫ {∫
K ′r (u− z)Kg
(
w −
λf
λg
s′ (v) z
)
dz
}2
dwdu. (A.10)
Now for any fixed (u,w) ∈ R2, by change of variables,∫
K ′r (u− z)Kg
(
w −
λf
λg
s′ (v) z
)
dz = −
∫
K ′r (y)Kg
(
w −
λf
λg
s′ (v) (y + u)
)
dy.
Then, ∫
Kf (u)
∫ {∫
K ′r (u− z)Kg
(
w −
λf
λg
s′ (v) z
)
dz
}2
dwdu
=
∫
Kf (u)
∫ {∫
K ′r (y)Kg
(
w −
λf
λg
s′ (v) (y + u)
)
dy
}2
dwdu. (A.11)
It follows from change of variables that∫ {∫
K ′r (y)Kg
(
w −
λf
λg
s′ (v) (y + u)
)
dy
}2
dw =
∫ {∫
K ′r (y)Kg
(
w −
λf
λg
s′ (v) y
)
dy
}2
dw,
for all u ∈ R. The conclusion follows from this result, (A.11) and the assumption Kr = Kf . 
Proof of Theorem 2. The proof is very similar to that of Theorem 3.1 of MMS. Let
V˜ (v) :=
1
N (N − 1)
2
hfh2g
1
(N · L)3
∑
(3)
Tjk η˜il,jk(v)Tj′k′ η˜il,j′k′(v),
with η˜il,jk(v) :=K
′
f
(
V̂ †jk − v
hf
)
1
s′
(
V̂ †jk
) ∫ b
b
1
hr
Kr
(
V̂ †jk − ξ (u)
hr
)
G (u)
g (u)
2Kg
(
Bil − u
hg
)
du
and
V (v) :=
1
N (N − 1)
2
hfh2g
1
(N · L)3
∑
(3)
ηil,jk(v)ηil,j′k′(v),
with ηil,jk(v) :=K
′
f
(
V †jk − v
hf
)
1
s′
(
V †jk
) ∫ b
b
1
hr
Kr
(
V †jk − ξ (u)
hr
)
G (u)
g (u)
2Kg
(
Bil − u
hg
)
du.
By the arguments used in the proof of Lemma 3,
V̂RGPV (v) =
1
N (N − 1)
2
hfh2g
1
(N · L)3
∑
(3)
Tjk η̂il,jk(v)Tj′k′ η̂il,j′k′(v), for all v ∈ I, w.p.a.1.
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By using Lemma 1, Lemma 2, (B.14), Taylor expansion, tedious algebra and empirical process techniques invoked in
the proof of Theorem 3.1 of MMS, one can show that
sup
v∈I
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1N (N − 1)2 hfh2g 1(N · L)3
∑
(3)
Tjk η̂il,jk(v)Tj′k′ η̂il,j′k′(v) − V˜ (v)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = Op
((
log (L)
Lh3
)1/2
+ h2
)
and
sup
v∈I
∣∣∣V (v)− V˜ (v)∣∣∣ = Op
((
log (L)
Lh3
)1/2
+ h2
)
.
Now note that
{
V (v) : v ∈ I
}
is a U process with VM (v) = E
[
V (v)
]
. One can apply Hoeffding decomposition to
V (v) and apply techniques invoked in the proof of Theorem 3.1 of MMS from empirical process and U process theory
to derive the uniform rate of convergence of V (v)−VM (v). Then the conclusion follows. 
Proof of Theorem 3. First, it can be verified by standard arguments that the function class
{
M‡2 (·; v) : v ∈ I
}
is
(uniformly) VC-type with respect to a constant envelope that is a multiple of h−2f h
−1
g . Then it essentially follows from
Lemma 7 and Theorem 2 that the process
Z (v) :=
f̂RGPV (v)− f (v)(
Lh2fhg
)−1/2
V̂RGPV (v)
1/2
, v ∈ I (A.12)
can be approximated by
Γ (v) :=
1
(N · L)
1/2
∑
i,l
M‡2 (Bil; v)− µM‡ (v)
Var
[
M‡2 (B11; v)
]1/2 , v ∈ I
uniformly in v ∈ I, with an estimated rate of uniform approximation error. See the proof of Lemma B.4 for details.
By adapting the proofs of Lemmas B.5 - B.9 of MMS, we can show that the bootstrap process {Z∗ (v) : v ∈ I} can
be approximated by the bootstrap analogue of Γ (v) uniformly in v ∈ I. The rest of the proof is identical to that of
Corollary 4.3 of MMS. We can show that the difference between the distribution of ‖Z‖I and that of ‖ΓG‖I , where
{ΓG (v) : v ∈ I} is an intermediate Gaussian process that has the same covariance structure as that of Γ , converges
to zero uniformly. See Theorem 4.3 of MMS and its proof. Then it can be shown that the difference between the
distribution of ‖Z∗‖I and that of ‖ΓG‖I converges to zero uniformly in the bootstrap world. See Theorem 4.4 of
MMS and its proof. The conclusion follows easily from these observations. See the proof of Corollaries 4.2 and 4.3 of
MMS. 
B Lemmas
Lemma 1. Suppose that Assumptions 1 - 3 are satisfied. Then we have
sup
b∈[b,b]
∣∣∣ξ̂ (b)− ξ (b)∣∣∣ = Op
((
log (L)
Lh
)1/2
+ h3
)
and
sup
b∈[b,b]
∣∣∣∣∣ξ̂ (b)− ξ (b) + 1N − 1 G (b)g (b)2 (ĝ (b)− g (b))− 1N − 1 Ĝ (b)−G (b)g (b)
∣∣∣∣∣ = Op
(
log (L)
Lh
+ h6
)
.
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Proof of Lemma 1. Standard arguments (see Lemma 1 of Marmer and Shneyerov, 2012) yield
sup
b∈[b,b]
∣∣∣Ĝ (b)−G (b)∣∣∣ = Op
((
log (L)
L
)1/2)
. (B.1)
The bias of the local quadratic MCE E [ĝ (b)]−g (b) is O
(
h3
)
uniformly over the entire support b ∈
[
b, b
]
. The stochastic
part ĝ (b)−E [ĝ (b)] can be shown to be Op
(
log (L)1/2 (Lh)−1/2
)
uniformly over the entire support b ∈
[
b, b
]
, by using
standard arguments (see, e.g., Newey, 1994). Therefore,
sup
b∈[b,b]
|ĝ (b)− g (b)| = Op
((
log (L)
Lh
)1/2
+ h3
)
. (B.2)
Applying the identity ab =
a
c −
a(b−c)
c2 +
a(b−c)2
bc2 ,
ξ̂ (b)− ξ (b) =
1
N − 1
{
−
G (b) (ĝ (b)− g (b))
g (b)
2 +
Ĝ (b)−G (b)
g (b)
+
Ĝ (b)
ĝ (b)
(ĝ (b)− g (b))
2
g (b)
2
−
(
Ĝ (b)−G (b)
)
(ĝ (b)− g (b))
g (b)
2
 . (B.3)
By using (B.1), (B.2) and (2.4),
sup
b∈[b,b]
∣∣∣∣∣G (b) (ĝ (b)− g (b))g (b)2
∣∣∣∣∣ = Op
((
log (L)
Lh
)1/2
+ h2
)
(B.4)
and
sup
b∈[b,b]
∣∣∣∣∣Ĝ (b)−G (b)g (b)
∣∣∣∣∣ = Op
((
log (L)
L
)1/2)
. (B.5)
Since sup
b∈[b,b]
|ĝ (b)− g (b)| = op (1) w.p.a.1, sup
b∈[b,b]
ĝ (b)
−1
<
(
Cg/2
)−1
, w.p.a.1 and consequently,
sup
b∈[b,b]
∣∣∣∣∣ Ĝ (b)ĝ (b) (ĝ (b)− g (b))
2
g (b)2
∣∣∣∣∣ > sup
b∈[b,b]
(ĝ (b)− g (b))2
= Op
(
log (L)
Lh
+ h6
)
.
The conclusion follows from this result, (B.3), (B.4) and (B.5). 
Lemma 2. Suppose that Assumptions 1 - 3 are satisfied. Then, (a). ŝ is strictly increasing on
[
ξ
(
b̂
)
, ξ
(
b̂
)]
, w.p.a.1;
(b).
ŝ
(
ξ
(
b̂
)
+ hr
)
− b̂ = Op (h) and b̂− ŝ
(
ξ
(
b̂
)
− hr
)
= Op (h) ;
(c).
sup
z∈
[
ξ(b̂)+hr,ξ
(
b̂
)
−hr
] |ŝ (z)− s (z)| = Op
((
log (L)
Lh
)1/2
+ h2
)
;
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(d).
sup
z∈
[
ξ(b̂)+hr ,ξ
(
b̂
)
−hr
] |ŝ
′ (z)− s′ (z)| = Op
((
log (L)
Lh3
)1/2
+ h2
)
;
(e). For any inner closed sub-interval [bl, bu] of
[
b, b
]
,
sup
b∈[bl,bu]
∣∣ŝ−1 (b)− ξ (b)∣∣ = Op
((
log (L)
Lh
)1/2
+ h2
)
.
Proof of Lemma 2. By the definition of ŝ, we have
ŝ′ (t) =
∫ b̂
b̂
1
hr
Kr
(
ξ̂ (b)− t
hr
)
db.
For any t ∈
[
ξ
(
b̂
)
, ξ
(
b̂
)]
, ŝ′ (t) > 0 if the measurable set
{
b ∈
[
b̂, b̂
]
:
∣∣∣ξ̂ (b)− t∣∣∣ ≤ hr} has positive measure. Let
rξ := sup
b∈[b,b]
∣∣∣ξ̂ (b)− ξ (b)∣∣∣ .
Clearly, {
b ∈
[
b̂, b̂
]
: |ξ (b)− t|+ rξ ≤ hr
}
⊆
{
b ∈
[
b̂, b̂
]
:
∣∣∣ξ̂ (b)− t∣∣∣ ≤ hr} .
By Lemma 1, rξ = op (h). Consequently, rξ ≤ hr/2 w.p.a.1, and{
b ∈
[
b̂, b̂
]
: |ξ (b)− t| ≤ hr/2
}
⊆
{
b ∈
[
b̂, b̂
]
:
∣∣∣ξ̂ (b)− t∣∣∣ ≤ hr} , for all t ∈ [ξ (b̂) , ξ (b̂)], w.p.a.1. (B.6)
Since ξ is continuous and strictly increasing on
[
b̂, b̂
]
,
{
b ∈
[
b̂, b̂
]
:
∣∣∣ξ̂ (b)− t∣∣∣ ≤ hr} has positive measure.
For Part (b), by change of variables and Fubini-Tonelli theorem, we have
ŝ
(
ξ
(
b̂
)
+ hr
)
− b̂ =
∫ b̂
b̂
∫ ∞
−∞
1
w ≤ ξ
(
b̂
)
+ hr − ξ̂ (b)
hr
Kr (w) dwdb
≤
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ b̂
b̂
1
(
ξ (b) ≤ rξ + ξ
(
b̂
)
+ (1− w) hr
)
dbKr (w) dw
=
∫ ∞
−∞
max
{
s
(
rξ + ξ
(
b̂
)
+ (1− w) hr
)
− b̂, 0
}
Kr (w) dw.
By a mean value expansion, we have∫ ∞
−∞
max
{
s
(
ξ
(
b̂
)
+ (1− w) hr + rξ
)
− b̂, 0
}
K (w) dw
≤
∫ ∞
−∞
∣∣∣s(ξ (b̂)+ (1− w) hr + rξ)− b̂∣∣∣K (w) dw
>
∫ ∞
−∞
|(1− w) hr + rξ|K (w) dw
=Op (h) ,
where the last equality holds since rξ = op (h). Therefore, ŝ
(
ξ
(
b̂
)
+ hr
)
−b̂ = Op (h). The proof of b̂−ŝ
(
ξ
(
b̂
)
− hr
)
=
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Op (h) is similar.
For Part (c), by the triangle inequality and a second-order Taylor expansion, we have
|ŝ (z)− s (z)| ≤
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∫ b̂
b̂
K˜r
(
z − ξ̂ (b)
hr
)
db −
∫ b̂
b̂
K˜r
(
z − ξ (b)
hr
)
db
∣∣∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∫ b̂
b̂
K˜r
(
z − ξ (b)
hr
)
db+ b̂− s (z)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
≤
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∫ b̂
b̂
1
hr
Kr
(
z − ξ (b)
hr
)(
ξ̂ (b)− ξ (b)
)
db
∣∣∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣∣12
∫ b̂
b̂
1
h2r
Kr
(
z − ξ˙ (b)
hr
)(
ξ̂ (b)− ξ (b)
)2
db
∣∣∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∫ b̂
b̂
K˜r
(
z − ξ (b)
hr
)
db+ b̂− s (z)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ , (B.7)
where ξ˙ (b) is the mean value satisfying
∣∣∣ξ˙ (b)− ξ (b)∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣ξ̂ (b)− ξ (b)∣∣∣ for each b ∈ [b̂, b̂]. Then we have
sup
z∈
[
ξ(b̂)+hr ,ξ
(
b̂
)
−hr
]
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∫ b̂
b̂
1
hr
Kr
(
z − ξ (b)
hr
)(
ξ̂ (b)− ξ (b)
)
db
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
 supz∈[ξ(b̂)+hr,ξ(b̂)−hr]
∫ b̂
b̂
1
hr
Kr
(
z − ξ (b)
hr
)
db
 rξ
≤
 supz∈[ξ(b̂)+hr,ξ(b̂)−hr]
∫ b̂
b̂
1
hr
1 (|z − ξ (b)| ≤ hr) db
 rξ
= Op
((
log (L)
Lh
)1/2
+ h3
)
, (B.8)
where the equality follows from Lemma 1 .
For all z ∈
[
ξ
(
b̂
)
+ hr, ξ
(
b̂
)
− hr
]
,
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∫ b̂
b̂
1
h2r
K
(
z − ξ˙ (b)
hr
)(
ξˆ (b)− ξ (b)
)2
db
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤

∫ b̂
b̂
1
h2r
Kr
(
z − ξ˙ (b)
hr
)
db
 r2ξ
>

∫ b̂
b̂
1
h2r
1 (|z − ξ (b)| ≤ hr + rξ) db
 r2ξ
≤

∫ b̂
b̂
1
h2r
1 (|z − ξ (b)| ≤ 2hr) db
 r2ξ , (B.9)
where the last inequality holds w.p.a.1 since rξ = op (h). Now by (B.7), (B.8) and (B.9),
sup
z∈
[
ξ(b̂)+hr ,ξ
(
b̂
)
−hr
]
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∫ b̂
b̂
K˜r
(
z − ξ̂ (b)
hr
)
db−
∫ b̂
b̂
K˜r
(
z − ξ (b)
hr
)
db
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = Op
((
log (L)
Lh
)1/2
+ h3
)
. (B.10)
For all z ∈
[
ξ
(
b̂
)
+ hr, ξ
(
b̂
)
− hr
]
, since K˜r (u) =
∫ u
−∞
Kr (t) dt and Kr is supported on [−1, 1],
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∫ b̂
b̂
K˜r
(
z − ξ (b)
hr
)
db+ b̂− s (z)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣
∫ s(z−hr)
b̂
K˜r
(
z − ξ (b)
hr
)
db+
∫ s(z+hr)
s(z−hr)
K˜r
(
z − ξ (b)
hr
)
db + b̂− s (z)
∣∣∣∣∣
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=∣∣∣∣∣s (z − hr) +
∫ s(z+hr)
s(z−hr)
K˜r
(
z − ξ (b)
hr
)
db− s (z)
∣∣∣∣∣ .
By change of variables and integration by parts,∫ s(z+hr)
s(z−hr)
K˜r
(
z − ξ (b)
hr
)
db =
∫ 1
−1
K˜r (−u)hrs
′ (hru+ z) du
= −s (z − hr) +
∫ 1
−1
s (z + hru)Kr (u) du.
Now it follows that
sup
z∈
[
ξ(b̂)+hr,ξ
(
b̂
)
−hr
]
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∫ b̂
b̂
K˜r
(
z − ξ (b)
hr
)
db+ b̂− s (z)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = supz∈[ξ(b̂)+hr,ξ(b̂)−hr]
∣∣∣∣∫ 1
−1
Kr (u) s (z + hru) du− s (z)
∣∣∣∣
= Op
(
h2
)
, (B.11)
where the second equality follows from Taylor expansion and the fact
∫
uKr (u) du = 0. The conclusion of Part (c)
follows from (B.7), (B.10) and (B.11).
For Part (d), note
|ŝ′ (z)− s′ (z)| ≤
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∫ b̂
b̂
1
hr
Kr
(
ξ̂ (b)− z
hr
)
db −
∫ b̂
b̂
1
hr
Kr
(
ξ (b)− z
hr
)
db
∣∣∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∫ b̂
b̂
1
hr
Kr
(
ξ (b)− z
hr
)
db− s′ (z)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ .
By arguments that are similar to those used to prove (B.10),
sup
z∈
[
ξ(b̂)+hr ,ξ
(
b̂
)
−hr
]
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∫ b̂
b̂
1
hr
Kr
(
ξ̂ (b)− z
hr
)
db −
∫ b̂
b̂
1
hr
Kr
(
ξ (b)− z
hr
)
db
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = Op
((
log (L)
Lh3
)1/2
+ h2
)
.
By integration by parts and Taylor expansion,
sup
z∈
[
ξ(b̂)+hr,ξ
(
b̂
)
−hr
]
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∫ b̂
b̂
1
hr
Kr
(
ξ (b)− z
hr
)
db− s′ (z)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = supz∈[ξ(b̂)+hr,ξ(b̂)−hr]
∣∣∣∣∫ 1
−1
Kr (u) s
′ (z + hru) du − s
′ (z)
∣∣∣∣
= Op
(
h2
)
.
The conclusion of Part (d) therefore follows.
For Part (e), Part (b) implies that [bl, bu] is contained in the interior of
[
ξ
(
b̂
)
+ hr, ξ
(
b̂
)
− hr
]
w.p.a.1. Then
Part (a) implies that
ŝ−1 (b) ∈
[
ξ
(
b̂
)
+ hr, ξ
(
b̂
)
− hr
]
and b = ŝ
(
ŝ−1 (b)
)
, for all b ∈ [bl, bu] , w.p.a.1. (B.12)
Therefore, for any b ∈ [bl, bu],
s
(
ŝ−1 (b)
)
− s (ξ (b)) = s′ (v˙)
(
ŝ−1 (b)− ξ (b)
)
for some mean value v˙ with |v˙ − ξ (b)| ≤
∣∣ŝ−1 (b)− ξ (b)∣∣. Then, since s′ is bounded away from zero (see Lemma A1
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of GPV),
sup
b∈[bl,bu]
∣∣ŝ−1 (b)− ξ (b)∣∣ > sup
b∈[bl,bu]
∣∣s (ŝ−1 (b))− s (ξ (b))∣∣
≤ sup
z∈
[
ξ(b̂)+hr,ξ
(
b̂
)
−hr
] |s (z)− ŝ (z)|
= Op
((
log (L)
Lh
)1/2
+ h2
)
,
where the second inequality follows from (B.12) and holds w.p.a.1.
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Lemma 3. Suppose that Assumptions 1 - 3 hold. Let Til := 1 (Vil ∈ [v − δ0, v + δ0]). Then we have
f̂RGPV (v)− f (v) =
1
N · L
∑
i,l
Til
1
h2f
K ′f
(
Vil − v
hf
)(
V̂ †il − Vil
)
+
1
2
f ′′ (v)
(∫
Kf (u)u
2du
)
h2f
+Op
(
log (L)
Lh3
+
(
log (L)
Lh
)1/2
+ h2
)
,
where the remainder term is uniform in v ∈ I.
Proof of Lemma 3. Write
f̂RGPV (v) =
1
N · L
∑
i,l
{
Til
1
hf
Kf
(
V̂ †il − v
hf
)
+ (1− Til)
1
hf
Kf
(
V̂ †il − v
hf
)}
.
Now for any v ∈
[
ξ
(
b̂
)
+ hf + hr, ξ
(
b̂
)
− hf − hr
]
,
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1N · L
∑
i,l
(1− Til)
1
hf
Kf
(
V̂ †il − v
hf
)∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤
1
N · L
∑
i,l
h−1f (1− Til)1
(∣∣∣V̂ †il − v∣∣∣ ≤ hf)
≤
1
N · L
∑
i,l
h−1f 1 (Bil > s (v + δ0))1 (Bil ∈ [ŝ (v − hf) , ŝ (v + hf )])
+
1
N · L
∑
i,l
h−1f 1 (Bil < s (v − δ0))1 (Bil ∈ [ŝ (v − hf ) , ŝ (v + hf )])
≤
1
N · L
∑
i,l
h−1f 1 (Bil > s (v + δ0))1 (Bil ∈ [s (v − hf)− rs, s (v + hf ) + rs])
+
1
N · L
∑
i,l
h−1f 1 (Bil < s (v − δ0))1 (Bil ∈ [s (v − hf )− rs, s (v + hf ) + rs]) ,
where rs := sup
z∈
[
ξ(b̂)+hr ,ξ
(
b̂
)
−hr
] |ŝ (z)− s (z)| and the second inequality holds w.p.a.1. Therefore,
f̂RGPV (v) =
1
N · L
∑
i,l
Til
1
hf
Kf
(
V̂ †il − v
hf
)
, for all v ∈ I, w.p.a.1.
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Let f˜ denote the infeasible estimator that uses the unobserved true valuations:
f˜ (v) =
1
N · L
∑
i,l
1
hf
Kf
(
Vil − v
hf
)
.
It now follows that
f̂RGPV (v)− f˜ (v) =
1
N · L
∑
i,l
Til
1
hf
(
Kf
(
V̂ †il − v
hf
)
−Kf
(
Vil − v
hf
))
, for all v ∈ I, w.p.a.1.
By a second-order Taylor expansion of the right-hand side of the above equality,
f̂RGPV (v)− f˜ (v) =
1
N · L
∑
i,l
Til
1
h2f
K ′f
(
Vil − v
hf
)(
V̂ †il − Vil
)
+
1
2
·
1
N · L
∑
i,l
Til
1
h3f
K ′′f
(
V˙il − v
hf
)(
V̂ †il − Vil
)2
,
(B.13)
for some mean value V˙il that lies on the line joining V̂
†
il and Vil.
Lemma 2(e) implies that
sup
v∈I
max
i,l
Til
∣∣∣V̂ †il − Vil∣∣∣ = Op
((
log (L)
Lh
)1/2
+ h2
)
. (B.14)
Since K ′′f is compactly supported on [−1, 1] and bounded, by the triangle inequality,
sup
v∈I
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1N · L
∑
i,l
Til
1
h3f
K ′′f
(
V˙il − v
hf
)(
V̂ †il − Vil
)2∣∣∣∣∣∣
>
supv∈I 1N · L∑
i,l
Tilh
−3
f 1
(∣∣∣V˙il − v∣∣∣ ≤ hf)

{
sup
v∈I
max
i,l
Til
(
V̂ †il − Vil
)2}
≤
supv∈I 1N · L∑
i,l
Tilh
−3
f 1 (|Vil − v| ≤ 2hf)

{
sup
v∈I
max
i,l
Til
(
V̂ †il − Vil
)2}
, (B.15)
where the last inequality holds w.p.a.1, since sup
v∈I
max
i,l
Til
∣∣∣V˙il − Vil∣∣∣ = op (h). It follows that
sup
v∈I
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1N · L
∑
i,l
Til
1
h3f
K ′′f
(
V˙il − v
hf
)(
V̂ †il − Vil
)2∣∣∣∣∣∣ = Op
(
log (L)
Lh3
+ h2
)
. (B.16)
By standard arguments for kernel density estimation,
f˜ (v)− E
[
f˜ (v)
]
= Op
((
log (L)
Lh
)1/2)
and E
[
f˜ (v)
]
− f (v) =
1
2
f ′′ (v)
(∫
Kf (u)u
2du
)
h2f + o
(
h2
)
, (B.17)
where the remainder terms are uniform in v ∈ I. The conclusion follows. 
Lemma 4. Suppose that Assumptions 1 - 3 hold. Let
s˜ (t) :=
∫ b
b
∫ t
−∞
1
hr
Kr
(
ξ (b)− u
hr
)
dudb+ b, t ∈ R.
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Then,
f̂RGPV (v)− f (v) = −
1
N · L
∑
i,l
1
h2f
TilK
′
f
(
Vil − v
hf
)
ŝ (Vil)− s˜ (Vil)
s′ (Vil)
+
1
2
f ′′ (v)
(∫
Kf (u)u
2du
)
h2f
+
1
2
(s′′′ (v) f (v) + s′′ (v) f ′ (v)) s′ (v)− s′′ (v) f (v) s′′ (v)
s′ (v)2
(∫
Kr (u)u
2du
)
h2r
+Op
(
log (L)
Lh3
+
(
log (L)
Lh
)1/2
+ h2
)
,
where the remainder term is uniform in v ∈ I.
Proof of Lemma 4. It follows from Lemma 2(b) that [s (vl − δ0) , s (vu + δ0)] is an inner closed sub-interval of[
ŝ
(
ξ
(
b̂
)
+ hr
)
, ŝ
(
ξ
(
b̂
)
− hr
)]
w.p.a.1. By Lemma 2(a), ŝ is strictly increasing on
[
ξ
(
b̂
)
+ hr, ξ
(
b̂
)
− hr
]
w.p.a.1
and for all Bil satisfying Bil ∈ [s (vl − δ0) , s (vu + δ0)], we have the following expansion by Dette et al. (2006, Lemma
A.1):
V̂ †il − Vil = −
(
ŝ− s
s′
)
◦ ξ (Bil) + χ1,il + χ2,il
where
χ1,il := −2
(
ŝ− s
s′ + λil (ŝ′ − s′)
·
ŝ′ − s′
s′ + λil (ŝ′ − s′)
)
◦ (s+ λil (ŝ− s))
−1
(Bil)
and
χ2,il :=
{
ŝ− s
s′ + λil (ŝ′ − s′)
·
(ŝ− s) (s′′ + λil (ŝ
′′ − s′′))
(s′ + λil (ŝ′ − s′))
2
}
◦ (s+ λil (ŝ− s))
−1
(Bil)
for some λil ∈ (0, 1) that depends on Bil. By Lemma 2(b),
(s+ λil (ŝ− s))
−1
(Bil) ∈
[
ξ
(
b̂
)
+ hr, ξ
(
b̂
)
− hr
]
, w.p.a.1,
for all Bil satisfying Bil ∈ [s (vl − δ0) , s (vu + δ0)]. Next, write
1
NL
∑
i,l
Til
1
h2f
K ′f
(
Vil − v
hf
)(
V̂ †il − Vil
)
=−
1
NL
∑
i,l
1
h2f
TilK
′
f
(
Vil − v
hf
)
ŝ (Vil)− s˜ (Vil)
s′ (Vil)
−
1
NL
∑
i,l
1
h2f
TilK
′
f
(
Vil − v
hf
)
s˜ (Vil)−Bil
s′ (Vil)
+
1
NL
∑
i,l
1
h2f
TilK
′
f
(
Vil − v
hf
)
χ1,il +
1
NL
∑
i,l
1
h2f
TilK
′
f
(
Vil − v
hf
)
χ2,il. (B.18)
By Lemma 2(c) and Lemma 2(d),
sup
i,l
Til |χ1,il| = Op
(
log (L)
Lh2
+ h4
)
.
For χ2il, since K
′
r is supported on [−1, 1],
sup
t∈
[
ξ(b̂)+hr,ξ
(
b̂
)
−hr
] |ŝ
′′ (t)| > sup
t∈
[
ξ(b̂)+hr ,ξ
(
b̂
)
−hr
]
∫ b̂
b̂
1
h2r
1 (|t− ξ (b)| ≤ hr + rξ) db
= Op
(
h−1
)
.
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It follows from this result, Lemma 2(c) and Lemma 2(d) that
sup
i,l
Til |χ2,il| = Op
(
log (L)
Lh2
+ h3
)
.
Now it is clear that
sup
v∈I
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1N · L
∑
i,l
1
h2f
TilK
′
f
(
Vil − v
hf
)
χ1,il
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
sup
v∈I
1
N · L
∑
i,l
∣∣∣∣∣ 1h2fK ′f
(
Vil − v
hf
)∣∣∣∣∣
(sup
i,l
Til |χ1,il|
)
= Op
(
log (L)
Lh3
+ h3
)
(B.19)
and similarly,
sup
v∈I
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1NL
∑
i,l
1
h2f
TilK
′
f
(
Vil − v
hf
)
χ2,il
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = Op
(
log (L)
Lh3
+ h2
)
. (B.20)
By the definition of s˜, when hf is small enough,
1
NL
∑
i,l
1
h2f
TilK
′
f
(
Vil − v
hf
)
s˜ (Vil)−Bil
s′ (Vil)
=
1
NL
∑
i,l
1
h2f
K ′f
(
Vil − v
hf
)
1
s′ (Vil)
(∫ b
b
K˜r
(
Vil − ξ (b)
hr
)
db + b− s (Vil)
)
.
By change of variable and integration by parts,
∫ b
b
K˜r
(
Vil − ξ (b)
hr
)
db =
∫ v
v
K˜r
(
Vil − u
hr
)
s′ (u) du
=b · K˜r
(
Vil − v
hr
)
− b · K˜r
(
Vil − v
hr
)
+
∫ v
v
1
hr
Kr
(
Vil − u
hr
)
s (u) du
=
∫ v
v
1
hr
Kr
(
Vil − u
hr
)
s (u) du− b,
when hr is small enough, for all Vil satisfying Vil ∈ [vl − δ0, vu + δ0].
Denote
βs (w) :=
∫ v
v
1
hr
Kr
(
w − u
hr
)
s (u) du− s (w)
and write
1
N · L
∑
i,l
1
h2f
K ′f
(
Vil − v
hf
)
1
s′ (Vil)
(∫ v
v
1
hr
Kr
(
Vil − u
hr
)
s (u) du− s (Vil)
)
=
 1N · L∑
i,l
1
h2f
K ′f
(
Vil − v
hf
)
βs (Vil)
s′ (Vil)
− E
[
1
h2f
K ′f
(
V11 − v
hf
)
βs (V11)
s′ (V11)
]+ E
[
1
h2f
K ′f
(
V11 − v
hf
)
βs (V11)
s′ (V11)
]
.
(B.21)
By standard argument for kernel density estimation (see, e.g., Newey, 1994), since s is three-times continuously
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differentiable,
βs (w) =
h2r
2
s′′ (w)
∫
u2Kr (u) du+ o
(
h2
)
β′s (w) =
h2r
2
s′′′ (w)
∫
u2Kr (u) du+ o
(
h2
)
, (B.22)
where the remainder terms are uniform in v ∈ I.
By change of variables,
E
[
1
h2f
K ′f
(
V11 − v
hf
)
βs (V11)
s′ (V11)
]
=
∫ v−v
hf
v−v
hf
1
hf
K ′f (z)
βs (hfz + v)
s′ (hfz + v)
f (hfz + v) dz
=
∫ v−v
hf
v−v
hf
1
hf
K ′f (z)
{
βs (v) f (v)
s′ (v)
+
(β′s (v˙) f (v˙) + βs (v˙) f
′ (v˙)) s′ (v˙)− βs (v˙) f (v˙) s
′′ (v˙)
s′ (v˙)2
hfz
}
dz, (B.23)
where v˙ is the mean value depending on z with |v˙ − v| ≤ hf |z|. It is clear that for small enough hf ,
βs (v) f (v)
s′ (v)
∫ v−vhf
v−v
hf
K ′f (z) dz
 = 0 for all v ∈ I.
Now it follows from (B.22) and (B.23) that
E
[
1
h2f
K ′f
(
V11 − v
hf
)
βs (V11)
s′ (V11)
]
=
h2r
2
(s′′′ (v) f (v) + s′′ (v) f ′ (v)) s′ (v)− s′′ (v) f (v) s′′ (v)
s′ (v)
2
∫
u2Kr (u) du+ o
(
h2
)
,
(B.24)
where the remainder term is uniform in v ∈ I.
Denote
S (z; v) :=
1
h2f
K ′f
(
z − v
hf
)
βs (z)
s′ (z)
and thus
1
N · L
∑
i,l
1
h2f
K ′f
(
Vil − v
hf
)
βs (Vil)
s′ (Vil)
− E
[
1
h2f
K ′f
(
V11 − v
hf
)
βs (V11)
s′ (V11)
]
=
1
N · L
∑
i,l
S (Vil; v)− E [S (V11; v)] .
By standard arguments (see the proof of Lemma B.3 of MMS), it can be easily verified that {S (·; v) : v ∈ I} is
(uniformly) VC-type with respect to a constant envelope FS which satisfies FS > h
−2
f sup
v∈[vl−δ0,vu+δ0]
|βs (v)| when hf
is small enough. The applying a maximal inequality (van der Vaart and Wellner, 1996, Theorem 2.14.1) yields
E
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1N · L
∑
i,l
S (Vil; v)− E [S (V11; v)]
∣∣∣∣∣∣
 ≤ L−1/2 |FS | = O (L−1/2) ,
when h is small enough. The conclusion follows from this result, (B.18), (B.19), (B.20) and (B.24). 
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Lemma 5. Suppose that Assumptions 1 - 3 hold. We have
f̂RGPV (v)− f (v) =
1
(N − 1)
1
(N · L)2
∑
i,l
∑
j,k
M (Bil, Bjk; v) +
1
2
f ′′ (v)
(∫
Kf (u)u
2du
)
h2f
+
1
2
(s′′′ (v) f (v) + s′′ (v) f ′ (v)) s′ (v)− s′′ (v)
2
f (v)
s′ (v)2
(∫
Kr (u)u
2du
)
h2r
+Op
(
log (L)
Lh3
+
(
log (L)
Lh
)1/2
+ h2
)
,
where the remainder term is uniform in v ∈ I.
Proof of Lemma 5. First we show
−
1
N · L
∑
i,l
1
h2f
TilK
′
f
(
Vil − v
hf
)
ŝ (Vil)− s˜ (Vil)
s′ (Vil)
=−
1
N − 1
1
N · L
∑
i,l
1
h2f
TilK
′
f
(
Vil − v
hf
)
1
s′ (Vil)
∫ b
b
1
hr
Kr
(
ξ (b)− Vil
hr
)
G (b)
g (b)2
(ĝ (b)− g (b)) db
+Op
(
log (L)
Lh3
+ h3 +
(
log (L)
Lh
)1/2)
.
Since by the Borel-Cantelli lemma we have∣∣∣̂b− b∣∣∣ = Op ( log (L)
L
)
,
∣∣∣̂b− b∣∣∣ = Op( log (L)
L
)
,
therefore,
1
N · L
∑
i,l
Til
1
h2f
K ′f
(
Vil − v
hf
)
ŝ (Vil)− s˜ (Vil)
s′ (Vil)
=
1
N · L
∑
i,l
Til
1
h2f
K ′f
(
Vil − v
hf
)
1
s′ (Vil)
∫ b
b
(
K˜r
(
Vil − ξ̂ (b)
hr
)
− K˜r
(
Vil − ξ (b)
hr
))
db+Op
(
log (L)
Lh
)
, (B.25)
where the remainder term is uniform in v ∈ I.
By a second-order Taylor expansion, we have
1
N · L
∑
i,l
Til
1
h2f
K ′f
(
Vil − v
hf
)
1
s′ (Vil)
∫ b
b
(
K˜r
(
Vil − ξ̂ (b)
hr
)
− K˜r
(
Vil − ξ (b)
hr
))
db
=
1
N − 1
1
N · L
∑
i,l
Til
1
h2f
K ′f
(
Vil − v
hf
)
1
s′ (Vil)
∫ b
b
1
hr
Kr
(
Vil − ξ (b)
hr
)
G (b)
g (b)
2 (ĝ (b)− g (b)) db
−
1
N − 1
1
N · L
∑
i,l
Til
1
h2f
K ′f
(
Vil − v
hf
)
1
s′ (Vil)
∫ b
b
1
hr
Kr
(
Vil − ξ (b)
hr
)
Ĝ (b)−G (b)
g (b)
db
+ I1 (v) + I2 (v) (B.26)
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where
I1 (v) := −
1
N · L
∑
i,l
Til
1
h2f
K ′f
(
Vil − v
hf
)
1
s′ (Vil)
∫ b
b
1
hr
Kr
(
Vil − ξ (b)
hr
)
×
{(
ξ̂ (b)− ξ (b)
)
+
1
N − 1
G (b)
g (b)
2 (ĝ (b)− g (b))−
1
N − 1
Ĝ (b)−G (b)
g (b)
}
db
and
I2 (v) :=
1
N · L
∑
i,l
Til
1
h2f
K ′f
(
Vil − v
hf
)
1
s′ (Vil)
∫ b
b
1
h2r
K ′r
(
Vil − ξ˙ (b)
hr
)(
ξ̂ (b)− ξ (b)
)2
db
for some mean value ξ˙ (b) with
∣∣∣ξ˙ (b)− ξ (b)∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣ξ̂ (b)− ξ (b)∣∣∣ for each b ∈ [b, b].
Then, by Lemma 1,
sup
v∈I
|I1 (v)| >
supv∈I 1N · L∑
i,l
1
h2f
∣∣∣∣K ′f (Vil − vhf
)∣∣∣∣

{
sup
v∈[vl−δ0,vu+δ0]
∫ b
b
1
hr
Kr
(
v − ξ (b)
hr
)
db
}
× sup
b∈[b,b]
∣∣∣∣∣(ξ̂ (b)− ξ (b))+ 1N − 1 G (b)g (b)2 (ĝ (b)− g (b))− 1N − 1 Ĝ (b)−G (b)g (b)
∣∣∣∣∣
= Op
(
log (L)
Lh2
+ h3
)
(B.27)
and
sup
v∈I
|I2 (v)| >
supv∈I 1N · L∑
i,l
1
h2f
∣∣∣∣K ′f (Vil − vhf
)∣∣∣∣

{
sup
v∈[vl−δ0,vu+δ0]
∫ b
b
1
h2r
K
(
v − ξ˙ (b)
hr
)
db
}
r2ξ
= Op
(
log (L)
Lh3
+ h3
)
, (B.28)
when the inequalities hold when hr is small enough.
Define
G (b, b′; v) :=
1
h2f
K ′f
(
ξ (b)− v
hf
)
1
s′ (ξ (b))
∫ b
b
1
hr
Kr
(
ξ (b)− ξ (z)
hr
)
1 (b′ ≤ z)−G (z)
g (z)
dz.
By the definition of G, we have
1
N · L
∑
i,l
Til
1
h2f
K ′f
(
Vil − v
hf
)
1
s′ (Vil)
∫ b
b
1
hr
Kr
(
Vil − ξ (b)
hr
)
Ĝ (b)−G (b)
g (b)
db
=
1
(N · L)
2
∑
(2)
G (Bil, Bjk; v) +
1
(N · L)
2
∑
i,l
G (Bil, Bil; v) , for all v ∈ I, (B.29)
when hf is small enough. The kernel G satisfies
G1 (b; v) :=
∫
G (b, b′; v) dG (b′) = 0 and µG (v) :=
∫ ∫
G (b, b′; v) dG (b′) dG (b) = 0, for all v ∈ I.
Also define
G2 (b; v) :=
∫
G (b′, b; v) dG (b′) .
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Hoeffding decomposition gives
1
(N · L)2
∑
(2)
G (Bil, Bjk; v) =
1
N · L
∑
i,l
G2 (Bil; v) +
1
(N · L)2
∑
(2)
{G (Bil, Bjk; v)− G2 (Bil; v)} . (B.30)
By standard arguments (see the proof of Lemma B.2 of MMS for details), it can be easily verified that {G (·, ·; v) : v ∈ I}
is (uniformly) VC-type with respect to a constant envelope FG which satisfies FG > h
−2
f . This implies
sup
v∈I
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1(N · L)2
∑
i,l
G (Bil, Bil; v)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = Op
((
Lh2
)−1)
. (B.31)
Application of a maximal inequality (Chen and Kato, 2017, Corollary 5.6) and Markov’s inequality gives
sup
v∈I
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1(N · L)2
∑
(2)
{G (Bil, Bjk; v)− G2 (Bil; v)}
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = Op
((
Lh2
)−1)
. (B.32)
Next, we show that
sup
v∈I
E
[
G2 (B11; v)
2
]
> h−1, (B.33)
when h is small enough. Denote
τ (z) :=
∫ b
b
1
h2f
K ′f
(
ξ (b)− v
hf
)
ξ′ (b)
1
hr
Kr
(
ξ (b)− ξ (z)
hr
)
g (b) db.
Then by change of variables and the Fubini-Tonelli theorem,∫
G2 (b; v)
2
dG (b)
≤
∫ b
b
{∫ b
b
τ (z)
1 (b ≤ z)
g (z)
dz
}2
g (b) db
=
∫ b
b
∫ b
b
τ (z)
g (z)
τ (z′)
g (z′)
G (min {z, z′}) dzdz′
=h2r
∫ v−v
hr
v−v
hr
∫ v−v
hr
v−v
hr
τ (s (hrw + v))
g (s (hrw + v))
τ (s (hrw
′ + v))
g (s (hrw′ + v))
G (min {s (hrw + v) , s (hrw
′ + v)}) s′ (hrw + v) s
′ (hrw
′ + v) dwdw′
=
2
h2f
∫ v−v
hr
v−v
hr
s′ (hrw
′ + v)
g (s (hrw′ + v))
∫ v−v
hr
v−v
hr
K ′f (u
′)Kr
(
λf
λr
u′ − w′
)
g (s (hfu
′ + v)) du′
×
∫ w′
v−v
hr
s′ (hrw + v)G (s (hrw + v))
g (s (hrw + v))
∫ v−v
hr
v−v
hr
K ′f (u)Kr
(
λf
λr
u− w
)
g (s (hfu+ v)) dudwdw
′, (B.34)
where the last equality follows from symmetry. It follows from integration by parts that
∫ ∫ w′
−∞
{∫
K ′f (u
′)Kr
(
λf
λr
u′ − w′
)
du′
}{∫
K ′f (u)Kr
(
λf
λr
u− w
)
du
}
dwdw′ = 0.
Then (B.33) follows from this result, (B.34) and Taylor expansion.
Since {G (·, ·; v) : v ∈ I} is (uniformly) VC-type with respect to a constant envelope FG which satisfies FG > h
−2
f ,
34
it follows from (B.33) and a maximal inequality (Chernozhukov et al., 2014a, Corollary 5.1) that
sup
v∈I
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1N · L
∑
i,l
G2 (Bil; v)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = Op
((
log (L)
Lh
)1/2
+
log (L)
Lh2
)
.12
Now it follows from this result, (B.29), (B.30), (B.31) and (B.32) that
1
N · L
∑
i,l
Til
1
h2f
K ′f
(
Vil − v
hf
)
1
s′ (Vil)
∫ b
b
1
hr
Kr
(
Vil − ξ (b)
hr
)
Ĝ (b)−G (b)
g (b)
db = Op
((
log (L)
Lh
)1/2
+
log (L)
Lh2
)
,
uniformly in v ∈ I. Then it follows from this result, (B.25), (B.26), (B.27) and (B.28) that
1
N · L
∑
i,l
Til
1
h2f
K ′f
(
Vil − v
hf
)
ŝ (Vil)− s˜ (Vil)
s′ (Vil)
=
1
N − 1
1
N · L
∑
i,l
Til
1
h2f
K ′f
(
Vil − v
hf
)
1
s′ (Vil)
∫ b
b
1
hr
Kr
(
Vil − ξ (b)
hr
)
G (b)
g (b)
2 (ĝ (b)− g (b)) db
+Op
((
log (L)
Lh
)1/2
+
log (L)
Lh2
+ h3
)
,
where the remainder term is uniform in v ∈ I.
By the definition of the MCE,
ĝ (b) =
1
N · L
∑
i,l
1
hg
Kg
(
Bil − b
hg
)
, for b ∈
[
b̂+ hg, b̂− hg
]
.
Therefore, since K ′f and Kr are compactly supported on [−1, 1], it is easy to verify that
−
1
N − 1
1
N · L
∑
i,l
1
h2f
TilK
′
f
(
Vil − v
hf
)
1
s′ (Vil)
∫ b
b
1
hr
Kr
(
ξ (b)− Vil
hr
)
G (b)
g (b)
2 (ĝ (b)− g (b)) db
=−
1
N − 1
1
N · L
∑
i,l
1
h2f
TilK
′
f
(
Vil − v
hf
)
1
s′ (Vil)
∫ b
b
1
hr
Kr
(
ξ (b)− Vil
hr
)
G (b)
g (b)2
×
 1
N · L
∑
j,k
1
hg
Kg
(
Bjk − b
hg
)
− g (b)
db, for all v ∈ I, w.p.a.1.
The conclusion follows from this result, (B.25), (B.26), (B.27), (B.28) and Lemma 5. 
Lemma 6. Suppose that Assumptions 1 - 3 hold. Let
βg (b) :=
∫ {
1
hg
Kg
(
b′ − b
hg
)
− g (b)
}
dG (b′) (B.35)
be the bias of the kernel density estimator of g (b). Then
µM (v) := −
∫ {
1
h2f
K ′f
(
ξ (u)− v
hf
)
1
s′ (ξ (u))
∫ b
b
1
hr
Kr
(
ξ (b)− ξ (u)
hr
)
G (b)βg (b)
g (b)
2 db
}
dG (u) = o
(
h2
)
,
12See the proof of Lemma B.2 of MMS for more details.
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uniformly in v ∈ I.
Proof of Lemma 6. By change of variables,
∫ {
1
h2f
K ′f
(
ξ (u)− v
hf
)
1
s′ (ξ (u))
∫ b
b
1
hr
Kr
(
ξ (b)− ξ (u)
hr
)
G (b)βg (b)
g (b)
2 db
}
dG (u)
=
∫ v−v
hf
v−v
hf
∫ v−v
hr
v−v
hr
1
hf
K ′f (w)Kr
(
z −
λf
λr
w
)
G (s (hrz + v))βg (s (hrz + v))
g (s (hrz + v))
2 s
′ (hrz + v) g (s (hfw + v)) dzdw. (B.36)
Let ψ (z) := G (s (z)) s′ (z) /g (s (z))
2
. By a mean value expansion, the second line of (B.36) is equal to
1
hf
∫ v−v
hf
v−v
hf
∫ v−v
hr
v−v
hr
K ′f (w)Kr
(
z −
λf
λr
w
){
ψ (v) βg (s (v)) +
(
ψ′ (v˙) βg (s (v˙)) + ψ (v˙)β
′
g (s (v˙)) s
′ (v˙)
)
hrz
}
× {g (s (v)) + g′ (s (v¨)) s′ (v¨)hfw} dzdw
=ψ (v) βg (s (v)) g (s (v))
1
hf
∫ v−v
hf
v−v
hf
∫ v−v
hr
v−v
hr
K ′f (w)Kr
(
z −
λf
λr
w
)
dzdw
+ ψ (v)βg (s (v))
∫ v−v
hf
v−v
hf
∫ v−v
hr
v−v
hr
K ′f (w)Kr
(
z −
λf
λr
w
)
g′ (s (v¨)) s′ (v¨)wdzdw
+ g (s (v))
1
hf
∫ v−v
hf
v−v
hf
∫ v−v
hr
v−v
hr
K ′f (w)Kr
(
z −
λf
λr
w
) (
ψ′ (v˙)βg (s (v˙)) + ψ (v˙)β
′
g (s (v˙)) s
′ (v˙)
)
hrzdzdw
+ hr
∫ v−v
hf
v−v
hf
∫ v−v
hr
v−v
hr
K ′f (w)Kr (z)
(
ψ′ (v˙)βg (s (v˙)) + ψ (v˙)β
′
g (s (v˙)) s
′ (v˙)
)
g′ (s (v¨)) s′ (v¨) zwdzdw, (B.37)
where v˙ and v¨ are mean values that are dependent on z and w with |v˙ − v| ≤ hr |z| and |v¨ − v| ≤ hf |w|. When h is
small enough, ∫ v−v
hf
v−v
hf
∫ v−v
hr
v−v
hr
K ′f (w)Kr
(
z −
λf
λr
w
)
dzdw = 0, for all v ∈ I. (B.38)
By standard arguments for the bias of kernel estimators for the density (see, e.g., Newey, 1994), since Kg is
supported on [−1, 1], for each b ∈ [s (vl − δ0) , s (vu + δ0)],
|βg (b)| ≤
h3g
6
sup
b′∈[b−hg,b+hg ]
|g′′′ (b′)|
∫ ∣∣u3Kg (u)∣∣ du, (B.39)
when hg is small enough. By change of variable and Taylor expansion, we have
sup
b∈[s(vl−δ0),s(vu+δ0)]
∣∣β′g (b)∣∣ = sup
b∈[s(vl−δ0),s(vu+δ0)]
∣∣∣∣∫ 1hgKg
(
b′ − b
hg
)
g′ (b′) db′ − g′ (b)
∣∣∣∣
≤ sup
b∈[s(vl−δ0),s(vu+δ0)]
h2g
2
∣∣∣∣∫ Kg (u)u2 (g′′′ (b˙)− g′′′ (b))du∣∣∣∣ , (B.40)
when hg is small enough, where b˙ is the mean value depending on u with
∣∣∣b˙− b∣∣∣ ≤ hg |u|. Since g′′′ is uniformly
continuous on any inner closed subset of
[
b, b
]
, the assumption that Kg is supported on [−1, 1] and (B.40) imply
that β′g (b) = o
(
h2
)
uniformly in b ∈ [s (vl − δ0) , s (vu + δ0)]. The conclusion follows from these results, (B.37) and
(B.38). 
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Lemma 7. Suppose that Assumptions 1 - 3 hold. Then
f̂RGPV (v)− f (v) =
1
(N − 1)
1
(N · L)2
∑
i,l
(M2 (Bil; v)− µM (v)) +
1
2
f ′′ (v)
(∫
Kf (u)u
2du
)
h2f
+
1
2
(s′′′ (v) f (v) + s′′ (v) f ′ (v)) s′ (v)− s′′ (v)
2
f (v)
s′ (v)2
(∫
Kr (u)u
2du
)
h2r
+Op
(
log (L)
Lh3
+
(
log (L)
Lh
)1/2
+ h2
)
.
Proof of Lemma 7. Hoeffding decomposition gives
1
(N · L)2
∑
i,l
∑
j,k
M (Bil, Bjk; v) = µM (v) +
 1N · L∑
i,l
M1 (Bil; v)− µM (v)
+
 1N · L∑
i,l
M2 (Bil; v)− µM (v)

+
1
(N · L)2
∑
(2)
{M (Bil, Bjk; v)−M1 (Bil; v)−M2 (Bjk; v) + µM (v)}
+
1
(N · L)
2
∑
i,l
M (Bil, Bil; v)−
1
(N · L) (N · L)2
∑
(2)
M (Bil, Bjk; v) . (B.41)
By standard arguments used in the proofs of Lemma B.2 and Lemma B.3 of MMS, it can be easily verified that the
class {M (·, ·; v) : v ∈ I} is (uniformly) VC-type with respect to a constant envelope FM that satisfies FM = O
(
h−3
)
.
Therefore, it is easy to check that∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1(N · L)2
∑
i,l
M (Bil, Bil; v)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = Op
((
Lh3
)−1)
and
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1(N · L) (N · L)2
∑
(2)
M (Bil, Bjk; v)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = Op
((
Lh3
)−1)
, (B.42)
uniformly in v ∈ I, and
sup
v∈I
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1(N · L)2
∑
(2)
{M (Bil, Bjk; v)−M1 (Bil; v)−M2 (Bjk; v) + µM (v)}
∣∣∣∣∣∣ = Op
((
Lh3
)−1)
(B.43)
follows from the maximal inequality Chen and Kato (2017, Corollary 5.6) and Markov’s inequality.
By change of variables,
M1 (b; v) =
1
h2f
Kf
(
ξ (b)− v
hf
)
ξ′ (b)
∫ b
b
1
hr
Kr
(
ξ (b)− ξ (z)
hr
)
G (z)
g (z)
2βg (z) dz
=
1
h2f
Kf
(
ξ (b)− v
hf
)
ξ′ (b)
∫ v−ξ(b)
hr
v−ξ(b)
hr
Kr (u)
G (s (hru+ ξ (b)))βg (s (hru+ ξ (b))) s
′ (hru+ ξ (b))
g (s (hru+ ξ (b)))
2 du.
By the arguments used in the proof of Lemma B.3, it can be verified that {M1 (·; v) : v ∈ I} is (uniformly) VC-type
with respect to a constant envelope FM1 that satisfies
FM1 > h
−2
f sup
b∈[s(vl−δ0),s(vu+δ0)]
|βg (b)| ,
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when h is small enough. The maximal inequality van der Vaart and Wellner (1996, Theorem 2.14.1) yields
E
sup
v∈I
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1N · L
∑
i,l
M1 (Bil; v)− µM (v)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
 > L−1/2FM1 = O (L−1/2h) .
The conclusion follows from this result, Markov’s inequality, (B.41), (B.42), (B.43) and Lemma 6. 
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